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Abstract
In this paper, we study a portfolio selection problem in which an agent trades a risk-
free asset and multiple risky assets with deterministic mean return rates and volatility
and wants to maximize the α-quantile of her wealth at some terminal time. Because
of the time inconsistency caused by quantiles, we consider intra-personal equilibrium
strategies. We find that among the class of time-varying, affine portfolio strategies, the
intra-personal equilibrium does not exist when α > 1/2, leads to zero investment in
the risky assets when α < 1/2, and is a portfolio insurance strategy when α = 1/2. We
then compare the intra-personal equilibrium strategy in the case of α = 1/2, namely
under median maximization, to some other strategies and apply it to explain why more
wealthy people invest more precentage of wealth in risky assets. Finally, we extend our
model to account for multiple terminal time.
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1 Introduction
Maximization of the mean of investment return leads to excessive risk taking, so in the
modern portfolio selection theory, investors are assumed to be concerned about not only the
mean but also the variance of investment return (Markowitz, 1952). On the other hand,
median is an alternative to mean to summarize a distribution. Median is also a special
case of quantile: The α-quantile of a distribution is defined to be the threshold such that
the probability of observing a value beyond this threshold is equal to α, and median is the
1/2-quantile.
In contrast to mean-variance analysis and expected utility maximization, the study of
median maximization and, more generally, quantile maximization is very limited in the
literature. Ethier (2004) show that Kelly portfolio, which was proposed by Kelly (1956)
and maximizes the long-run growth rate of wealth, also maximizes the median of wealth
in some special market settings among all portfolios that are constant over time. Manski
(1988) considers a preference model in which an individual maximizes the α-quantile of
her utility for some α ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, the author shows α measures the individual’s
risk attitude with the riskiness of a distribution defined in terms of quantile-preserving
spreads. Chambers (2009) proves that a representation of an individual’s preferences for
distributions is invariant to ordinal transformation and weakly monotonic with respect to
first-order stochastic dominance if and only if it is the α-quantile of the individual’s utility
for some α ∈ (0, 1). Rostek (2010) axiomatizes quantile maximization in a Savage setting.
Using the framework proposed by Anscombe et al. (1963), de Castro and Galvao (2019b)
prove that an individual’s preferences are represented by quantile maximization if and only
if her tastes and beliefs over consequences are completely separable. de Castro and Galvao
(2019b) further provide axiomatization for a dynamic, discrete-time quantile model in which
an individual evaluates consumption streams by recursive preferences but using quantile,
instead of the standard expected utility, as the representation of risk attitude in the recursive
preferences. de Castro et al. (2019) consider a single-period portfolio selection problem in
which an agent maximizes the quantile of her portfolio of two risky stocks or of a risk-free
asset and a risky stock. Giovannetti (2013) considers a single-period asset pricing model with
a representative agent who maximizes the quantile of her consumption utility. de Castro and
Galvao (2019a) apply the dynamic quantile model proposed by de Castro and Galvao (2019b)
to portfolio selection and asset pricing in a multi-period setting.
The scarcity of the literature on median maximization is largely because quantiles do not
have as nice properties as expectations. As pointed out by de Castro and Galvao (2019a),
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the following difficulties arise in the study of quantile maximization: quantiles are not linear,
the law of iterated expectation cannot apply, and we cannot interchange a differentiation
and a quantile operator.
In the present paper, we study dynamic portfolio selection under quantile maximization.
More precisely, we consider an agent who trades a risk-free asset and multiple risky assets
continuously in time with an objective of maximizing the α-quantile of her wealth at certain
terminal time. The risk-free rate and the mean return rates and volatility of the risky assets
are assumed to be deterministic, i.e. the Black-Scholes model. In addition, the agent faces
some cone constraints on her portfolio, an example being the constraint of no short sales.
This portfolio problem is time inconsistent in that a dynamic portfolio that, at the current
time, maximizes the quantile of the terminal wealth does not necessarily maximizes the
quantile of the terminal wealth at future time. This is in contrast to the dynamic portfolio
selection problem considered by de Castro and Galvao (2019a), where the authors employ the
dynamic quantile model proposed by de Castro and Galvao (2019b). Indeed, in that dynamic
quantile model, quantiles are used at the beginning of each period to evaluate certain risk at
the end of the period. In other words, quantile maximization in that model is only applied
in every single period, so there is no time inconsistency caused by quantiles. In our model,
however, the agent evaluates the quantile of her wealth at the terminal time, and there is a
positive, continuous time period between the time of the evaluation of the quantile and the
terminal time, so time inconsistency arises.
Because of time inconsistency, without self-control or the help of commitment devices,
the agent cannot commit her future selves to following the dynamic portfolio that maximizes
the quantile of her terminal wealth today. Following the literature on time inconsistency,
we consider so-called intra-personal equilibrium portfolio strategies; see for instance Strotz
(1955-1956), Ekeland and Lazrak (2006), Bjo¨rk et al. (2017), He and Jiang (2019), and
the references therein. More precisely, we assume that the agent has no self control, so we
regard her selves at different time to be different players in a game and seek an equilibrium in
this game. As a result, an intra-personal equilibrium is a time-consistent portfolio strategy
because at any time the agent is not willing to deviate from it and thus is able to implement
it throughout the investment horizon.
We focus on time-varying affine strategies under which the dollar amount invested in the
risky assets are affine functions of the agent’s wealth and the intercepts and linear coefficients
are time varying. This family of strategies include many commonly used strategies, such as
investing a certain proportion of wealth in the risky assets, investing a wealth-independent
dollar amount in the risky assets, and the mixture of the above two strategies taken in
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different time periods. We prove that for α-quantile maximization with α > 1/2, there
does not exist an intra-personal equilibrium strategy that is time varying and affine. For
α-quantile maximization with α < 1/2, a time-varying affine strategy is an intra-personal
equilibrium strategy if and only if it leads to zero investment in the risky assets at all time.
For 1/2-quantile maximization, namely, median maximization, a time-varying affine strategy
is an intra-personal equilibrium strategy if and only if it is a portfolio insurance strategy
under which the agent sets up a portfolio insurance level ξ and invests any capital in excess
of ξ into Kelly portfolio and the remaining into the risk-free asset. In particular, we derive
multiple intra-personal equilibrium strategies because different portfolio insurance levels lead
to different investment strategies.
Our results show that in continuous-time portfolio selection, the risk attitude of the agent
does not vary smoothly as α changes. When α > 1/2, the agent is too risk seeking to take
limited risk. When α < 1/2, the agent is so risk averse that she takes no risk at all. When
α = 1/2, the agent takes nonzero, limited risk. In this case, we show that with a smaller
portfolio insurance level ξ, the median of the terminal wealth becomes strictly larger at any
time and any wealth level but the agent can end up with lower wealth levels. Therefore, ξ
becomes a parameter that trades off the growth of the portfolio, which is measured by the
median of the terminal wealth, and the risk of the portfolio, which is measured by the lowest
level that the agent’s wealth in the future may touch. Thus, we can consider ξ to be the
second parameter to represent the agent’s risk attitude.
We then compare the intra-personal equilibrium strategy to fractional Kelly strategies and
find that neither of them dominates the other in terms of median of the terminal wealth. The
intra-personal equilibrium strategy, however, entails less risk than fractional Kelly strategies
because it implies a higher level of minimum wealth. We also compare the intra-personal
equilibrium strategy to the pre-committed strategy and the naive strategy under median
maximization. The pre-committed strategy is one that maximizes the quantile of the ter-
minal wealth at the initial time, so it is optimal for the agent’s self at the initial time. The
naive strategy is the actual strategy implemented by the agent if she were not aware of the
time-inconsistency and thus, at each time, is only able to implement in an infinitesimally
period of time the strategy that maximizes the quantile of the terminal wealth at that time.
We find that the pre-committed strategy can lead to arbitrarily large holding of the risky
assets and leads to capped wealth, so it is less preferable to the intra-personal equilibrium
strategy. Under the naive strategy, the agent would take an infinite amount of risk around
the terminal time and the median of the terminal wealth is always lower than that of the
intra-personal equilibrium strategy. Thus, the naive strategy is not preferable either.
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As an application, we find that the intra-personal equilibrium strategy can explain an
empirical finding by Wachter and Yogo (2010): Households with a higher level of wealth
tend to have a larger portfolio shares in risky assets (i.e., to invest more percentage of
their wealth in risky assets). This empirical finding cannot be explained by expected utility
maximization with a power utility function even when the asset prices have stock volatility,
stochastic return rates, or jumps, because the resulting optimal percentage of wealth invested
in risky assets is independent of the agent’s wealth. The mean-variance log return model
proposed by Dai et al. (2019) cannot explain the finding either because in their model the
percentage of wealth invested in risky assets is independent of the agent’s wealth as well.
Under the intra-personal equilibrium strategy in our model, which is derived in the simple
Black-Scholes model, households with a higher level of wealth indeed have a larger portfolio
shares in risky assets. The intuition is as follows: When households become older, their
wealth, on average, also becomes larger and thus farther away from the portfolio insurance
level, so they invest more in the risky assets.
Finally, we extend our model to the case in which the agent is concerned about quantile
of wealth at multiple time points, e.g., the quantle of wealth in one year and the quantile
of wealth at the retirement age. We set the objective function to be a weighted average
of the quantile of wealth at a finite set of different terminal times and study intra-personal
equilibrium strategies. Again, we find that among the family of time-varying, affine strate-
gies, intra-personal equilibrium does not exist when α > 1/2, must be zero-investment in
the risky assets when α < 1/2, and is a portfolio insurance strategy when α = 1/2.
Quantiles can be regarded as a special case of preference representations that involve
probability weighting, such as rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982), prospect theory (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and the dual theory of choice
(Yaari, 1987). Quantiles are also related to risk measures, such as value-at-risk and expected
shortfall. Most studies of portfolio selection under preferences with probability weighting
or under various risk measures in dynamic settings focus on pre-committed strategies; see
for instance Basak and Shapiro (2001), He et al. (2015), Jin and Zhou (2008), He and Zhou
(2011, 2016), and van Bilsen and Laeven (2020). On the other hand, Epstein and Zin (1990)
and De Giorgi and Legg (2012) employ rank-dependent utility and prospect theory to eval-
uate risks in every single period in their models of recursive preferences, so similar to the
dynamic quantile model proposed by de Castro and Galvao (2019b), their models do not
lead to time inconsistency. Ma et al. (2019) and He et al. (2019) study how the proba-
bility weighting function in certain preference model evolves over time so as to make the
pre-committed strategies consistent over time.
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We are only aware of several works that study equilibrium strategies in models with
preferences involving probability weighting. Barberis (2012) study a casino gambling problem
in which an agent with prospect theory preferences decides when to stop playing independent
and identically distributed bets, and one of the strategies the author considers in his model is
intra-personal equilibrium. His work is extended by Ebert and Strack (2017) to a continuous-
time setting. Huang et al. (2020) study a similar problem but with a different approach.
Note that all the above three works study optimal stopping problems in which the control
variable is binary, while in the present paper we consider portfolio selection in which the
control variable is continuous. Hu et al. (2020) study portfolio selection for an agent with
rank-dependent utility preferences in a complete, continuous-time market where the mean
return rates and volatility of the assets are deterministic. The authors consider intra-personal
equilibrium for the agent due to the time-inconsistency caused by the agent’s preferences.
Their notion of intra-personal equilibrium, however, differs from ours. More precisely, they
assume that the dollar amount invested in the risky assets by the future selves of the agent
remains the same even if the wealth of the future selves changes. In our notion, the agent’s
future selves are assumed to take fixed investment strategies, e.g., to invest 10% of wealth in
the risky assets. As a result, when the agent’s self today takes a different investment strategy,
the wealth of the agent’s future selves changes and, consequently, the dollar amount invested
in the risky assets by the future selves also change. Our notion of intra-personal equilibrium
is consistent with the standard definition of equilibrium in the game theory and is also used
by most studies on time-inconsistent problems in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we propose the model
and define the notion of intra-personal equilibrium strategies. In Section 3, we show the
intra-personal equilibrium strategy for quantile maximization. In Section 4 we discuss the
properties of the intra-personal equilibrium strategy for median maximization and compare
it with various other strategies. In Section 5 we consider the case in which the agent is
concerned about wealth at multiple time points. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs are
presented in Appendix A. In Appendix B we present some distributional properties of linear
SDEs that will be used in our proofs. In Appendix C we solve a portfolio selection problem
that is related to the pre-committed strategy for quantile maximization.
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2 Model
2.1 Notations
Denote the transpose of any matrix A as A⊤ and denote the Euclidean norm of a vector
a as ‖a‖. For any nonempty interval I, denote by C(I) the set of continuous functions from
I to certain metric space B, where B varies with and will be clear in different contexts. For
any c < d, denote by Cpw([c, d)) the set of functions g from [c, d) to B such that there exists
c =: t0 < t1 < · · · < tN := d and g on each [ti−1, ti) can be continuously extended to [ti−1, ti],
i = 1, . . . , N . In other words, Cpw([c, d)) is the set of piece-wise continuous functions.
2.2 Market
Consider an agent who can trade a risk-free asset and m risky assets continuously in the
time period [0, T ]. The price of the risk-free asset, denoted as S0(t), and the price of risky
asset i, denoted as Si(t), i = 1, . . . , m, follow
dS0(t) = S0(t)r(t)dt, t ≥ 0,
dSi(t) = Si(t)
[(
bi(t) + r(t)
)
dt+
d∑
j=1
σij(t)dWj(t)
]
, t ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , m,
where W (t) :=
(
W1(t), ...,Wd(t)
)⊤
, t ≥ 0 is a standard, d-dimensional Brownian motion.
Here and hereafter, we denote the transpose of any matrix A as A⊤ and denote the Euclidean
norm of a vector a as ‖a‖. The risk-free rate r(t), excess mean return rate vector of the risky
assets b(t) :=
(
b1(t), . . . , bm(t)
)⊤
, and volatility matrix of the risky assets σ(t) :=
(
σi,j(t)
)
satisfy the following assumption that will be in force throughout of the paper.
Assumption 1 r, b, and σ are deterministic and belong to Cpw([0, T )). Moreover, the
following two non-degeneracy conditions hold: (i) b(t) 6= 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ) and (ii) there
exists δ > 0 such that σ(t)σ(t)⊤ − δI is positive semi-definite for all t ∈ [0, T ), where I
stands for the m-dimensional identity matrix.
Suppose at each time t an agent invests πi(t) dollars in risky asset i, i = 1, . . . , m and
the remaining of her wealth in the risk-free asset. Then, the dynamics of the agent’s wealth,
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denoted as X(t), follow
dX(t) =
(
r(t)X(t) + π(t)⊤b(t)
)
dt+ π(t)⊤σ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ], (2.1)
where π(t) :=
(
π1(t), . . . , πm(t)
)⊤
is referred to as the agent’s portfolio.
2.3 Portfolio Selection Problem
Suppose that the agent is endowed with initial wealth x0 at time 0 and wants to maximize
the median of her terminal wealth (i.e., wealth at the end time T ). The agent faces some
portfolio constraints, such as the no-short-selling constraint, represented by Qπ(t) ≥ 0, t ∈
[0, T ) for some n-by-m matrix Q. Suppose that the agent is going to revisit the portfolio
decision at each time t ∈ [0, T ), with the same objective of maximizing the median of the
terminal wealth. In contrast to expected utility maximization, a portfolio π(s), s ∈ [0, T )
that maximizes the median of the terminal wealth at time 0 does not necessarily maximize
the median of the terminal wealth at time t, leading to time-inconsistent behavior. To obtain
consistent investment behavior, we follow the literature to consider the so-called equilibrium
strategies, in which the agent is assumed to have no control of her selves in the future and
thus the selves at different time can be viewed as different players in a game.
Formally, we restrict ourselves to consider Markovian portfolio strategies pi that are
mappings from [0, T ) × R to Rm: At time t with wealth x at that time, the agent invests
pi(t, x) dollars in the risky assets. A portfolio strategy pi is feasible if (i) there exists L > 0
such that |pi(t, x) − pi(t, y)| ≤ L|x − y|, |pi(t, x)| ≤ L(1 + |x|),∀t ∈ [0, T ), x, y ∈ R, which
implies that the following wealth equation
{
dXpi0,x0(t) =
(
r(t)Xpi0,x0(t) + pi(s,X
pi
0,x0
(t))⊤b(t)
)
dt+ pi(t, Xpi0,x0(t))
⊤σ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Xpi0,x0(0) = x0
(2.2)
has a unique strong solution, and (ii) Qpi(t, Xpi0,x0(t)) ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ). Denote by Π the set of
feasible portfolio strategies pi.
As the agent may revisit the portfolio selection problem at any intermediate time t ∈
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[0, T ) with any wealth level x, we also consider the following SDE
{
dXpit,x(s) =
(
r(s)Xpit,x(s) + pi(s,X
pi
t,x(s))
⊤b(s)
)
ds+ pi(s,Xpit,x(s))
⊤σ(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
Xpit,x(t) = x.
(2.3)
For each pi ∈ Π, the above SDE has a unique strong solution, which represents the agent’s
wealth process if she starts at time t with wealth x and follows pi to invest. Denote by
Fpi(t, x, y) := P(Xpit,x(T ) ≤ y), y ∈ R (2.4)
the cumulative distribution function of the terminal wealth given wealth level of x at time
t, and denote by
Gpi(t, x, α) := sup{y ∈ R : Fpi(t, x, y) ≤ α}, α ∈ (0, 1)
the (right-continuous) quantile function of the terminal wealth given wealth level of x at
time t. In particular, Gpi(t, x, 1/2) is the median of the terminal wealth given wealth level
of x at time t.
Suppose that the agent wants to maximize the α-level quantile of her terminal wealth.
In particular, when α = 1/2, the agent is a median maximizer. Because quantile maximiza-
tion leads to time-inconsistency, we consider so-called intra-personal equilibrium. Formally,
suppose that we are given a strategy pˆi ∈ Π. Denote by Xx0,pˆit the set of reachable wealth
levels at time t from the initial wealth x0 at time 0 and following the strategy pˆi; i.e., X
x0,pˆi
t
is defined as follows:
X
x0,pˆi
t = int(SXpˆi0,x0 (t)
)
∪
{
x ∈ ∂SXpˆi0,x0 (t) : P
(
X pˆi0,x0(t) ∈ Bδ(x) ∩ ∂SXpˆi0,x0 (t)
)
> 0 for all δ > 0
}
, (2.5)
where Bδ(x) denotes the ball with radius δ and centered at x, SXpˆi0,x0 (t)
is the support of
X pˆi0,x0(t) and int(SXpˆi0,x0 (t)
), ∂SXpˆi0,x0 (t)
denote the interior and the boundary of SXpˆi0,x0 (t)
respec-
tively.
Definition 1 pˆi ∈ Π is an intra-personal equilibrium for α-level quantile maximization if
for any t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Xx0,pˆit , and π 6= pˆi(t, x) with Qπ ≥ 0, there exists ǫ0 ∈ (0, T − t) such
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that
Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)−Gpˆi(t, x, α) ≤ 0, ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0], (2.6)
where
pˆit,ǫ,π(s, y) =

π, s ∈ [t, t+ ǫ), y ∈ R,
pˆi(s, y), s /∈ [t, t+ ǫ), y ∈ R.
(2.7)
Imagine that at time t, the agent is only able to control herself for a period of length ǫ,
so she can choose to invest any dollar amount π in the risky assets in the period [t, t + ǫ)
and after that period she is expected follow certain given strategy, e.g., pˆi. As a result, the
strategy that the agent will actually implement until the end date is pˆit,ǫ,π as defined by
(2.7). Definition 1 then stipulates that pˆi is an intra-personal equilibrium if at any time
t with any wealth level x that is reachable at that time under pˆi, the objective function,
namely, the quantile of the terminal wealth, becomes smaller if she chooses an alternative
amount π (satisfying the portfolio constraints) to invest in the risky assets, assuming that
she is only able to control herself to invest π dollars in the risky assets in an infinitesimally
small period of time.
The above definition of equilibrium strategies is so-called regular equilibrium, which
slightly differs from the notion of weak equilibrium that is used in most studies of continuous-
time time-inconsistent problems in the literature. As explained in He and Jiang (2019), the
notion of regular equilibrium is preferred to the notion of weak equilibrium because the agent
can still be willing to deviate from a weak equilibrium strategy and take a very different
alternative.
Because the discount factor for the period [0, s], namely e−
∫ s
0 r(u)du, is a deterministic
function of s ∈ [0, T ], maximizing the quantile of the terminal wealth is equivalent to max-
imizing the quantile of the discounted terminal wealth. Thus, for notational simplicity, in
the following presentation, we set r ≡ 0 without loss of generality.
3 Main Results
Let us first present Kelly’s portfolio. Assume the following, which stipulates that at each
time, one can find a portfolio with a positive instantaneous mean return rate:
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Assumption 2 For any t ∈ [0, T ), the set {v ∈ Rm | b(t)⊤v > 0, Qv ≥ 0} is nonempty and
for any t ∈ (0, T ], the set {v ∈ Rm | b(t−)⊤v > 0, Qv ≥ 0} is nonempty, where b(t−) denotes
the left-limit of b at t.
For each t ∈ [0, T ), denote by v∗(t) the optimal solution to following problem
{
min
v∈Rm
1
2
v⊤σ(t)σ(t)⊤v − b(t)⊤v,
subject to Qv ≥ 0.
(3.1)
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For each fixed t ∈ [0, T ), v∗(t) 6= 0 and
b(t)⊤v∗(t) = ‖σ(t)⊤v∗(t)‖2 > 0. Consequently, v∗ ∈ Cpw([0, T );Rm), inft∈[0,T ) ‖v∗(t)‖ > 0,
and inft∈[0,T ) ‖σ(t)⊤v∗(t)‖ > 0.
It is well known that Kelly’s portfolio, namely the one that maximizes the expected
logarithmic utility of the terminal wealth, is
piKelly(t, x) = v
∗(t)x, t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R. (3.2)
See for instance Karatzas and Shreve (1998).
We are particularly interested in the following family of affine strategies:
A =
{
pi | pi(t, x) = θ0(t) + θ1(t)x, t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R
for some θ0, θ1 ∈ Cpw([0, T )) taking values in Rm
}
.
Note that this family of strategies include many commonly used strategies, such as investing
a certain proportion of wealth in the risky assets, investing a wealth-independent dollar
amount in the risky assets, and the mixture of the above two strategies taken in different
time periods. Note that Kelly’s strategy is an affine one.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) Suppose α = 1/2. Then, pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium if and only if
pˆi(t, x) = v∗(t)(x− ξ), t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R (3.3)
for some constant ξ < x0.
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(ii) Suppose α ∈ (0, 1/2). Then, pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium if and only if
pˆi(t, x) = θ(t)(x− x0), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R (3.4)
for some θ ∈ Cpw([0, T )).
(iii) Suppose α ∈ (1/2, 1). Then, any pˆi ∈ A is not an intra-personal equilibrium.
Theorem 1-(i) characterizes all affine strategies that are intra-personal equilibria for me-
dian maximization. The wealth process X pˆi0,x0 under intra-personal equilibrium (3.3) satisfies{
d(X pˆi0,x0(t)− ξ) = (X pˆi0,x0(t)− ξ)
[
v∗(t)⊤b(t)dt + v∗(t)⊤σ(t)dW (t)
]
, t ∈ [0, T ],
X pˆi0,x0(t) = x0 > ξ.
Therefore, X pˆi0,x0(t) > ξ for all t ∈ [0, T ], and the set of reachable wealth levels at time t
is (ξ,+∞) for t ∈ (0, T ]. Thus, ξ stands for the guaranteed wealth level, or a portfolio
insurance level.
By definition, revising the value of pˆi(t, x) for x /∈ Xx0,pˆit changes neither the wealth process
X pˆi0,x0 nor whether or not pˆi is an intra-personal equilibrium. Therefore, any p˜i such that p˜i
agrees with pˆi as given by (3.3) for x ∈ Xx0,pˆit , t ∈ [0, T ), e.g., p˜i(t, x) = v∗(t)(x − ξ)+, t ∈
[0, T ), x ∈ R, is also an intra-personal equilibrium.
Theorem 1-(i) also shows that there exist multiple intra-personal equilibria for median
maximization, parameterized by the portfolio insurance level ξ, and the multiplicity here
is generic in that the dollar amount invested in the risky assets, pˆi(t, X pˆi0,x0(t)), differs with
respect to different values of ξ. Multiplicity of intra-personal equilibria for time-inconsistent
problems has been noted in the literature both in discrete settings (see e.g., Vieille and
Weibull 2009 and Cao and Werning 2018) and in continuous-time settings (see e.g., Ekeland
and Lazrak 2010 and Cao and Werning 2016).
Theorem 1-(ii) shows that an affine strategy pˆi is an intra-personal equilibrium for quantile
maximization with quantile level α < 1/2 if and only if it is given by (3.4), i.e., if and only
if pˆi(t, x0) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ). As a result, under the equilibrium strategy, pˆi(t, X pˆi0,x0(t)) = 0, t ∈
[0, T ), i.e., the agent does not invest in the risky assets at all. Theorem 1-(iii) shows that
for quantile maximization with quantile level α > 1/2, there does not exist an intra-personal
equilibria that is affine in the wealth level.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Consider any strategy p˜i such that p˜i
agrees with pˆi as given by (3.3) for x ∈ Xx0,pˆit , t ∈ [0, T ) and that p˜i(t, x) is continuous in
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x. Then, for any t ∈ (0, T ), there exists ǫ0 ∈ (0, T − t) such that Gp˜it,ǫ,v∗(t)(t, ξ, 1/2) > ξ =
Gpˆi(t, ξ, 1/2) for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), where p˜it,ǫ,π is defined similarly as in (2.7) with pˆi therein
replaced by p˜i.
In Definition 1, a portfolio strategy is an intra-personal equilibrium if at any time and
any reachable wealth level, the agent is not willing to deviate from it in the sense of condition
(2.6). It is reasonable to exclude wealth levels that are not reachable in the test of whether
a strategy is an intra-personal equilibrium because the actions of the agent’s future selves at
those wealth levels are irrelevant from the perspective of the agent’s self today. Proposition 1
shows that if we mechanically force the condition (2.6) to hold for all wealth levels, even those
that are not reachable, then for the median maximization problem the portfolio strategies
we derive in Theorem 1 are no longer intra-personal equilibrium.1 Proposition 1 also shows
why we define the set of reachable wealth levels at each time t to be (2.5) rather than to be
the support of X pˆi0,x0(t): for the strategy (3.3), ξ is in the support of X
pˆi
0,x0
(t), but it does not
satisfy the condition (2.6) and is actually not visited by the wealth process.
4 Discussion of Consistent Portfolio Strategies for Me-
dian Maximization
In this section, we further discuss the intra-personal equilibria for median maximization
as given by (3.3). To highlight the dependence of this intra-personal equilibria on ξ, we
denote it as pˆiξ in the following.
4.1 Portfolio Insurance
Proposition 2 For any ξ < x0,
Gpˆiξ(t, x, 1/2) = ξ + (x− ξ)e 12
∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds, x ∈ Xx0,pˆiξt , t ∈ [0, T ). (4.1)
Moreover, for any ξ1 < ξ2 < x0, G
pˆiξ1 (t, x, 1/2) > Gpˆiξ2 (t, x, 1/2) for any t ∈ [0, T ) and
x ∈ Xx0,pˆiξ2t ⊇ Xx0,pˆiξ1t .
The multiplicity of intra-personal equilibria for median maximization raises a question
of which equilibrium strategy to choose. Proposition 2 shows that with a smaller portfolio
1Almost all the existing literature on time inconsistency consider all states including those that are not
reachable; see He and Jiang (2019) for a discussion and for the relevant references.
13
insurance level ξ, at any time and any wealth level, the median of the terminal wealth
becomes strictly larger. On the other hand, with a smaller portfolio insurance level ξ, the
agent’s wealth in the future can reach lower wealth levels. Therefore, ξ becomes a parameter
that trades off the growth of the portfolio, which is measured by the median of the terminal
wealth, and the risk of the portfolio, which is measured by the lowest level the agent’s
wealth in the future may touch. As a comparison, the mean-variance portfolio selection
problem features a tradeoff between the growth and risk of the portfolio that are measured
respectively by the expectation and variance of the portfolio return.
Now, imagine that an investor specifies a maximum amount of loss L, e.g., 20% of the
initial wealth, she can tolerate. Moreover, she wants to maximize the median of her terminal
wealth and to have a consistent investment plan. Then, portfolio (3.3) with ξ = x0 − L can
be recommended to her.
4.2 Comparison with Fractional Kelly
One of the critiques of Kelly’s strategy is that it entails too much risk, and to address
this issue, the so-called fractional Kelly strategies have been proposed in the literature; see
for instance MacLean et al. (1992). Formally, fixing γ > 0, a γ-fractional Kelly strategy is
defined to be
piγ−Kelly(t, x) = γv∗(t)x, t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R. (4.2)
It is well known that in the market setting in the present paper, the γ-fractional Kelly
strategy is the one that maximizes the expected utility of terminal wealth with a constant
relative risk aversion degree 1/γ; see for instance Karatzas and Shreve (1998). For γ ∈ (0, 1),
the γ-fractional Kelly strategy leads to less investment in the risky assets compared to the
Kelly strategy.
Now, for the intra-personal equilibrium pˆiξ for median maximization with ξ ∈ (0, x0), we
have
pˆiξ(t, x)/x =
(
(x− ξ)/x)v∗(t), x > ξ.
Therefore, compared to Kelly’s strategy, pˆiξ implies less investment in the risky assets because
(x − ξ)/x < 1. In the following, we compare the intra-personal equilibrium pˆiξ with the
fractional Kelly strategy in terms of their growth and risk.
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Proposition 3 For any γ > 0,
Gpiγ−Kelly(t, x, 1/2) = xe(γ−
1
2
γ2)
∫ T
t ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds, x > 0, t ∈ [0, T ). (4.3)
Moreover, for fixed ξ ∈ (0, x0), γ ∈ (0, 1), and t ∈ [0, T ), we have
at,γ :=
e
1
2
∫ T
t ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds − 1
e
1
2
∫ T
t ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds − e(γ− 12γ2)
∫ T
t ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
> 1, (4.4)
and Gpiγ−Kelly(t, x, 1/2) is strictly larger than (strictly smaller than, respectively) Gpˆiξ(t, x, 1/2)
if and only if x < at,γξ (x > at,γξ, respectively).
Proposition 3 shows that at time t ∈ (0, T ), neither of the intrapersonal equilibrium pˆiξ
and the fractional Kelly strategy dominates the other in terms of median of the terminal
wealth: the former implies a higher median of the terminal wealth than the latter when the
wealth level is high and vice versa when the wealth level is low. At the initial time (with
initial wealth x0), which of the above two strategies imply a higher median of the terminal
wealth depends on the value of ξ and γ. On the risk side, the intrapersonal equilibrium pˆiξ
entails less risk than the fractional Kelly strategy in that the former implies a higher level
of minimum wealth. Finally, as implied by Theorem 1, the fractional Kelly strategy (except
for the case γ = 1) is not an intrapersonal equilibrium for median maximization; i.e., it is
an inconsistent investment strategy for median maximization.
4.3 Household Portfolio Shares
Wachter and Yogo (2010) find that households with a higher level of wealth tend to have
a larger portfolio shares in risky assets (i.e., to invest more percentage of their wealth in risky
assets). More precisely, in one of their studies, the authors consider a representative sample,
provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, of approximately 3,000
households. In this sample, the net worth, i.e., the wealth, and the portfolio share in risky
assets of each household is observed. The authors conduct linear regression with the log net
worth as the explanatory variable and the portfolio share in risky assets as the dependent
variable in the cross-section of households. The authors divide the households in the sample
into four age groups: 26–35, 36–45, 56–65, 66–75, and find that the portfolio share in risky
assets is more positively correlated with the log net worth for elder age groups; see Table 4
of Wachter and Yogo (2010).
The above empirical finding cannot be explained by expected utility maximization with
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a power utility function even when the asset prices have stock volatility, stochastic return
rates, or jumps, because the resulting optimal percentage of wealth invested in risky assets
is independent of the agent’s wealth. The mean-variance log return model proposed by Dai
et al. (2019) cannot explain the finding either because in their model the percentage of wealth
invested in risky assets is independent of the agent’s wealth as well. Wachter and Yogo (2010)
develop a life-cycle consumption and portfolio choice model to explain this empirical finding.
The intra-personal equilibrium under median maximization is consistent with the empir-
ical finding in Wachter and Yogo (2010). Suppose that the households follow pˆiξ for some
ξ > 0 to do investment. Then, when households become older, their wealth x also becomes
larger on average, so the portfolio shares in risky assets, which is (x − ξ)/x under pˆiξ, also
become larger. To confirm the above intuition, we conduct a numerical analysis in the
following.
Suppose that there are 3,000 households in the market, indexed by j = 1, . . . , 3000,
and their age is between 26 and 35. Each household j is endowed with initial wealth x0,j
and has a portfolio insurance level α, e.g., 60%, proportion of her initial wealth, i.e., ξj =
αx0,j , j = 1, . . . , 3, 000. As a result, the portfolio shares in risky assets for household j are
(x0,j − ξj)/x0,j = 1 − α, which are the same for different households. Now, imagine that
after t years, household j’s investment in risky assets generate a gross return rate Rt,j, so
her wealth becomes Xt,j = ξj + (x0,j − ξj)Rt,j and thus her portfolio shares in risky assets
becomes
pt,j :=
ξj + (x0,j − ξj)Rt,j − ξj
ξj + (x0,j − ξj)Rt,j =
(1− α)Rt,j
α + (1− α)Rt,j .
Note that after t = 10, 20, 30, and 40 years, the households’ age become 36–45, 46–55,
56–65, and 66–75, respectively. Thus, for each t ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40}, we follow Wachter and
Yogo (2010) to run linear regression with lnXt,j as the explanatory variable and pt,j as the
dependent variable.
We simulate the initial wealth of the 3,000 households by setting x0,j to be the j-th
sample of x¯0e
̺U , where U is a standard normal random variable. Thus, ln x¯0 and ̺ represents
respectively the average log net worth and the standard deviation of the log net worth across
households with in the age group 26–35. We use the sample provided by Survey of Consumer
Finances that tracks the wealth of US households every three years from 1989 to 2016 to
estimate x¯0 and ̺.
2 Following the study in Wachter and Yogo (2010), we exclude households
with non-positive net worth or with no risky-asset holding from the sample. Using the data
2The sample is available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm.
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in 2016, we obtain the following estimates: x¯0 = 61811.8 and ̺ = 0.0569.
On the other hand, according the survey data by Survey of Consumer Finances from the
same source as above, the percentage of net worth invested in risky assets for households in
the age group 26–35 ranges from 40% to 58% across different survey years. Thus, we set the
value of 1 − α to be in the range 40%–60%, so we choose three values of α: 40%, 50% and
60%.
We simulate the gross return rate Rt,j of the 3,000 households from the following distribu-
tion: (1+µt)e−
1
2
̟2t+̟
√
tZ , where Z is a standard normal random variable that is independent
of U , µ = 4%, and ̟ > 0. In other words, we set the average excess return rate per year
across households to be 4%, and ̟ measures the standard deviation of the annual log return
rate across households. Because we do not have the data to estimae ̟, we simply choose
three values of ̟ in the following: 0.65%,0.70%,0.75%.
Finally, we run linear regression with Xt,j to be the explanatory variable and pt,j to
be the dependent variable to obtain the coefficient of lnXt,j . We repeat the simulation
for 2,000 times and report the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the coef-
ficient of lnXt,j in Table 1, where different rows and columns refer to different values of
t ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40} (corresponding to age 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and 66–75, respectively) and
̟ ∈ {0.65%, 0.70%, 0.75%}. We can see that the coefficient is indeed more positive for larger
with t, which is consistent with the empirical finding in Wachter and Yogo (2010). Moreover,
we report in the last row of Table 1 the sensitivity of portfolio shares in risky assets with
respect to net worth in the empirical study of Wachter and Yogo (2010, Table 4), and it
shows that our model can generate quantitatively comparable sensitives as well.
4.4 Comparison with Pre-Committed and Naive Strategies
When facing time inconsistency, some individuals may commit their future selves to
follow the plans they set up today that are optimal under today’s decision criteria, and such
plans are called pre-committed strategies. For instance, one can delegate her investment to
a portfolio manager and asks the manager to maximize her decision criterion today. In the
following, we compare the intra-personal equilibrium pˆiξ under median maximization, which
is a rational choice of an agent who is not able to commit her future selves to following
her plan today, with the pre-committed strategy under median maximization. To facilitate
the comparison, we assume the same portfolio insurance level ξ in the derivation of the
pre-committed strategy.
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26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65 66–75
α = 40% 0 1.26 (0.09) 2.28 (0.11) 3.02 (0.11) 3.52 (0.11)
̟ = 0.65% α = 50% 0 1.23 (0.11) 2.41 (0.13) 3.38 (0.15) 4.13 (0.14)
α = 60% 0 1.06 (0.11) 2.27 (0.15) 3.41 (0.17) 4.39 (0.18)
α = 40% 0 1.45 (0.10) 2.60 (0.12) 3.40 (0.11) 3.92 (0.12)
̟ = 0.70% α = 50% 0 1.41 (0.11) 2.74 (0.14) 3.82 (0.15) 4.62 (0.16)
α = 60% 0 1.22 (0.12) 2.60 (0.16) 3.88 (0.18) 4.96 (0.19)
α = 40% 0 1.65 (0.11) 2.93 (0.13) 3.79 (0.12) 4.32 (0.12)
̟ = 0.75% α = 50% 0 1.61 (0.12) 3.10 (0.15) 4.28 (0.16) 5.12 (0.16)
α = 60% 0 1.39 (0.12) 2.95 (0.17) 4.37 (0.19) 5.53 (0.19)
Wachter and Yogo (2010) 0.52 1.84 3.88 4.32
Table 1: Sensitivity (in percentage) of portfolio shares in risky assets pt,j with respect to wealth
lnXt,j in the cross-section of households. The second to sixth columns refer the age group 26–35,
36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 66–75, respectively, which correspond to t = 0, 10, 20, 30, and 40,
respectively. The number of households is 3,000, and their initial net worth is simulated from
x¯0e
̺U with x¯0 = 61811.8 and ̺ = 0.0569, where U is a standard normal random variable. The
value of α is set to be 40%, 50%, and 60%. The gross return rate of the households are simulated
from (1 + µt)e−
1
2
̟2t+̟
√
tZ with µ = 4% and ̟ to one of the three values: =0.65%, 0.70%, and
0.75%, where Z is a standard normal random variable independent of U . The numbers in
parentheses are standard error of the estimates of the sensitivities. The last row reports the
sensitivity of portfolio shares in risky assets with respect to net worth in the empirical study of
Wachter and Yogo (2010, Table 4).
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Proposition 4 (i) The pre-committed strategy pi0,pc that maximizes the time-0 median of
the terminal wealth is
pi0,pc(t, x) = ∆0,pc(t, x)v
∗(t)(x− ξ), t ∈ [0, T ), x > ξ, (4.5)
∆0,pc(t, x) : =
1√∫ T
t
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
× Φ
′(d(t, z0(t, x)))
Φ
(
d(t, z0(t, x))
) ,
d(t, z) : =
− ∫ T
t
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ + z√∫ T
t
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ))‖2dτ
with z0(t, x) uniquely determined by
x− ξ
Φ
(
d(t, z0(t, x))
) = x0 − ξ
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
0
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
) =: k∗0.
Moreover,
X
pi0,pc
0,x0 (T ) = ξ + k
∗
01
∫ T
0
v∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ)≥0,
and ∆0,pc(t, x) is strictly decreasing, continuous in x and satisfies
lim
x↓ξ
∆0,pc(t, x) = +∞, lim
x↑ξ+k∗0
∆0,pc(t, x) = 0.
(ii) Gpi0,pc(0, x0, 1/2) = ξ + k
∗
0, and
Gpi0,pc(t, x, 1/2) =

ξ + k
∗
0, x ∈ [x0, ξ + k∗0),
ξ, x ∈ (ξ, x0),
t ∈ (0, T ).
In addition, Gpi0,pc(0, x0, 1/2) > G
pˆiξ(0, x0, 1/2), and for any t ∈ (0, T ),
Gpi0,pc(t, x, 1/2)

≥ G
pˆiξ(t, x, 1/2), x0 ≤ x ≤ ξ + (x0 − ξ)a˜t,
< Gpˆiξ(t, x, 1/2), x ∈ (ξ, x0) ∪ (ξ + (x0 − ξ)a˜t, ξ + k∗0),
(4.6)
a˜t := e
− 1
2
∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds/Φ

−
√∫ T
0
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ

 ∈ (1, k∗0/(x0 − ξ)).
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Proposition 4-(i) shows the pre-committed portfolio strategy under median maximization.
Recall that under the intra-personal equilibrium pˆiξ, the agent’s dollar amount invested in
the risky assets is proportional to the distance between the current wealth and portfolio
insurance level, and the proportion is independent of the current wealth level. For the pre-
committed portfolio strategy, however, this proportion depends on the current wealth level
and can become arbitrarily large when the wealth approaches the portfolio insurance level.
In terms of the wealth process, under the intra-personal equilibrium, the agent has potential
to attain arbitrarily high wealth levels in the future, but under the pre-committed portfolio
strategy, the wealth in the future is capped at certain level ξ + k∗0.
The pre-committed portfolio strategy obviously implies a higher level of time-0 median
of the terminal wealth than the intra-personal equilibrium. After the initial time, i.e., at
time t ∈ (0, T ), however, the pre-committed portfolio strategy results in smaller median of
the terminal wealth than the intra-personal equilibrium when the wealth level at that time
is very low or very high; see (4.6).
It can be costly to implement pre-committed strategies; for instance, portfolio delegation
usually incurs some management fees. In some situations, individuals can be unaware of the
time-inconsistency or wrongly believe that they can commit their future selves to the plan set
up today. As a result, they may keep re-optimizing and updating their plans over time. In
the extreme case, at each instant an agent can only implement her plan for an infinitesimally
small time period and re-optimizes and updates the plan afterwards. The resulting strategy
that is actually implemented by the agent over time is called the naive strategy.
Proposition 5 The naive portfolio strategy pina under median maximization is given by
pina(t, x) = ∆na(t)v
∗(t)(x− ξ), (4.7)
where
∆na(t) :=
1√∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
×
Φ′
(
−
√∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
)
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
) . (4.8)
Moreover, ∆na(t) > 1, t ∈ [0, T ) and limt↑T ∆na(t) = +∞. Furthermore, for any fixed
t ∈ [0, T ) and x > ξ, denoting by Gpina(t, x, 1/2) the limit of the median, conditional on
time-t wealth level of x, of the wealth at time τ as τ goes to T , we have Gpina(t, x, 1/2) = ξ.
Proposition 5 shows that under the naive strategy, the dollar amount invested in the
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risky assets is also proportional to the distance between the current wealth level and the
portfolio insurance level. Moreover, the proportion is always strictly larger than 1, implying
higher risky asset holdings than the intra-personal equilibrium. The proportion even goes to
infinity when it is near the terminal time, showing that under the naive strategy, the agent
would take an infinite amount of risk around the terminal time.
Because under the naive strategy the agent invests infinite amount of money in risky
assets around the terminal time, the terminal wealth of the naive strategy is not well defined.
We, however, can still study the wealth around the terminal time, in particular the median
of the wealth at time τ when τ is very close to the terminal time. It turns out that the limit
of the median exists when τ goes to the terminal time T , and the limit is ξ. This shows
that in terms of the median of terminal wealth, the naive strategy always underperforms the
intra-personal equilibrium. The reason is because under the naive strategy the agent takes
an infinite amount of risk around the terminal time, which significantly reduces the median
of the terminal wealth.
4.5 Expected Utility Maximization
Proposition 6 The intra-personal equilibrium pˆiξ for median maximization is the optimal
portfolio strategy that maximizes E[ln(Xpi(T )− ξ)].
Proposition 6 shows that the intra-personal equilibrium pˆiξ under median maximization
is the same as the portfolio that maximizes the expected utility of the terminal wealth with
utility function log(x− ξ). This utility function is a special case of the so-called hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion (HARA); see for instance Section 6 of Merton (1971) and Kim and
Omberg (1996). It is worth emphasizing that we are only able to prove the above equivalence
between the intra-personal equilibrium under median maximization and expected utility
maximization with a logarithmic utility function in the market setting in the present paper.
5 Multiple Target Dates
Due to different life objectives, such as education, kids, and retirement, investors may
concern their wealth at multiple time points that respectively correspond to those objectives;
see for instance Sironi (2016). In the following, we generalize our model in Section 2 to
account for multiple objectives.
Suppose that the agent is concerned about the her wealth at not only the terminal
time T but also some intermediate moments. More precisely, consider multiple time points
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0 =: T0 < T1 < · · · < TN := T . At time t ∈ [Tn−1, Tn) with wealth x, the agent’s
decision criterion at that time is a weighted average of the α-level quantile of her wealth at
Tn, Tn+1, . . . , TN , i.e., is
Jpi(t, x, α) =
i=N∑
i=n
wn,iG
pi(t, x, α;Ti), (5.1)
where Gpi(t, x, α;Ti) stands for the α-level quantile of X
pi
t,x(Ti), wn,i ≥ 0, i = n, . . . , N are
constants and satisfy
∑N
i=n wn,i = 1, and wn,N > 0.
Definition 2 pˆi ∈ Π is an intra-personal equilibrium for multiple-time-point α-level quantile
maximization if for any n = 1, . . . , N , t ∈ [Tn−1, , Tn), x ∈ Xx0,pˆit , and π 6= pˆi(t, x) with
Qπ ≥ 0, there exists ǫ0 ∈ (0, T − t) such that
J pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)− J pˆi(t, x, α) ≤ 0, ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0], (5.2)
where pˆit,ǫ,π is given by (2.7).
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) Suppose α = 1/2. Then, pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for multiple-time-
point α-level quantile maximization if and only if pˆi is given by (3.3) for some constant
ξ < x0.
(ii) Suppose α ∈ (0, 1/2). Then, pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for multiple-
time-point α-level quantile maximization if and only if it is given by (3.4) for some
θ ∈ Cpw([0, T )).
(iii) Suppose α ∈ (1/2, 1). Then, any pˆi ∈ A is not an intra-personal equilibrium for
multiple-time-point α-level quantile maximization.
Theorem 2 shows that the intra-personal equilibrium for multiple-time-point quantile
maximization is the same as for single-time-point quantile maximization. In particular,
for median maximization, although the decision criterion jumps at each time point Ti, the
portfolio insurance level remains constant over time.
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6 Conclusions
Median is a popular alternative to mean as a summary statistic of a distribution. In this
paper, we studied portfolio selection under the α-quantile maximization, particularly under
median maximization when α is set to be 1/2. We considered an agent who trades a risk-
free asset and multiple risky assets continuously in time with an objective of maximizing the
α-quantile of her wealth at certain terminal time, and the mean return rates and volatility
of the assets are assumed to be deterministic. Because of time inconsistency, we considered
intra-personal equilibrium strategies.
We found that in the class of time-varying, affine portfolio strategies, the intra-personal
equilibrium does not exist when α > 1/2 and leads to zero investment in the risky assets
when α < 1/2. For the case of α = 1/2, namely the case of median maximization, a time-
varying affine strategy is an intra-personal equilibrium strategy if and only if it is a portfolio
insurance strategy. Different choices of the portfolio insurance level then induce different
intra-personal equilibria and can be interpreted as different degrees of risk attitude of the
agent.
We compared the intra-personal equilibrium strategy under median maximization to
fractional Kelly strategies, the pre-committed strategy, and the naive strategy under median
maximization, and found that the intra-personal equilibrium strategy is better than the oth-
ers. We also showed that the intra-personal equilibrium strategy can explain why households
with a higher level of wealth tend to invest more percentage of their wealth in risky assets.
Finally, we extended our model to the case in which the agent is concerned about median of
wealth at multiple time points and derived similar results.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We introduce some notations to be used in the following proof.
For any interval [a, b) and open set O in Rl, denote by C0,∞([a, b)×O) the set of functions
g(t, z) from [a, b)×O to R such that its derivatives with respect to z of any order exist and
are continuous in (t, z) on [a, b)×O and by C1,∞([a, b)×O) the set of functions g(t, z) from
[a, b) × O to R such that its first-order derivative with respect to t and its derivatives with
respect to z of any order exist and are continuous in (t, z) on [a, b)×O.
For any x ∈ Rl and δ ≥ 0, denote by Bℓδ(x) := {y ∈ Rl | ‖y − x‖ ≤ δ}.
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The proof of Theorem 1 is divided into three parts: In Section A.1.1, we prove a crucial
lemma. In Section A.1.2, we prove the sufficiency part of the theorem: pˆi as given by (3.3) and
(3.4) are equilibrium strategies for respective α’s. In Section A.1.3, we prove the remaining
part of the theorem. Because the proof is involved, we present it by summarizing important
intermediate steps of the proofs as lemmas and relegate all proofs in Section A.1.4.
A.1.1 Calculation of Derivatives
Lemma 2 Consider any pˆi ∈ A, i.e., pˆi(t, x) = θ0(t) + θ1(t)x, t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R with
θ0, θ1 ∈ Cpw([0, T )), and define
t∗ : = inf{t ∈ [0, T ) : θ0(s) = θ1(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t, T )}, (A.1)
t∗ : = inf{t ∈ [0, t∗) : θ0(s) + ξθ1(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t, t∗) and some ξ ∈ R}. (A.2)
Then, if t∗ < t∗, there exists unique ξ ∈ R such that θ0(s) + ξθ1(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t∗, t∗). Denote
S
pˆi
t = ∅, t ∈ [0, t∗), Spˆit = {ξ}, t ∈ [t∗, T ). (A.3)
Then, for any t ∈ [0, t∗), there exists η ∈ (0, t∗ − t) such that for any x ∈ R\Spˆit , α ∈ (0, 1),
and π ∈ Rm, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α) is continuous in ǫ ∈ [0, η), F pˆiy (t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α)) > 0, and
lim
ǫ↓0
Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)−Gpˆi(t, x, α)
ǫ
= −A
πF pˆi(t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
=
ϕpˆit,x,α(pˆi(t, x))− ϕpˆit,x,α(π)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
, (A.4)
where Aπ is applied to F pˆi(t, x, y) as a function of (t, x) with Aπf(t, x) := ft(t, x)+b(t)⊤πfx(t, x)+
1
2
‖σ(t)⊤π‖2fxx(t, x) and
ϕpˆit,x,α(v) := F
pˆi
x (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))b(t)⊤v +
1
2
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))‖σ(t)⊤v‖2. (A.5)
Lemma 2 provides the derivative Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α) in ǫ = 0. For t ∈ [t∗, T ), it is obvious that
F pˆi(t, x, y) = 1x≤y and thus is not differentiable in x and y. For t ∈ [0, t∗), we have desired
differentiability except at singular points x ∈ Spˆit .
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A.1.2 Sufficiency
Proposition 7 pˆi as given by (3.3) is an equilibrium strategy for α = 1/2 and pˆi as given
by (3.4) is an equilibrium strategy for α ∈ (0, 1/2).
A.1.3 Necessity
Lemma 3 Consider pˆi ∈ A and define t∗, t∗, ξ, and Spˆit as in Lemma 2. Suppose that pˆi is
an intra-personal equilibrium strategy for a given α ∈ (0, 1). Then, for any t ∈ [0, t∗) and
x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit , we have F pˆixx(t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α)) > 0, F pˆix (t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α)) < 0, and
pˆi(t, x) = −F
pˆi
x (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
v∗(t). (A.6)
Lemma 3 proves a necessary condition for pˆi ∈ A to be an equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 4 Consider pˆi ∈ A, recall t∗, t∗, and ξ as defined in Lemma 2, and define
t := sup{s ∈ [0, T ] : θ0(τ) + θ1(τ)x0 = 0, ∀τ ∈ [0, s]}. (A.7)
Then, t ≥ t∗ if and only if t = T . Moreover, if pˆi is an intra-personal equilibrium strategy
for α ∈ [1/2, 1), then t∗ = T and t = 0.
The differentiability result in Lemma 2 applies to t ∈ [0, t∗) only. On the other hand, for
t ∈ [0, t], Xx0,pˆit = {x0} is a singleton, so we cannot obtain too much information about the
property of an equilibrium strategy. Thus, we expect to conduct analysis of the equilibrium
strategy for t ∈ (t, t∗), and Lemma 4 provides some properties of the interval (t, t∗).
Lemma 5 Consider pˆi ∈ A, recall t∗, t∗, ξ, and Spˆit as defined in Lemma 2 and t as defined
in Lemma 4. Suppose t < t∗ and pˆi is an intra-personal equilibrium strategy for a given
α ∈ (0, 1). Then,
(i) For each t ∈ (t, T ], Xx0,pˆit is either (x(t),+∞) for some x(t) ∈ R, or (−∞, x¯(t)) for
some x¯(t) ∈ R, or R. Moreover, Xx0,pˆit is increasing in t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) There exists a0, a1 ∈ C([t, t∗]) taking values in R such that
− F
pˆi
x (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
= a0(t) + a1(t)x > 0, t ∈ (t, t∗), x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit , (A.8)
pˆi(t, x) =
(
a0(t) + a1(t)x
)
v∗(t), (t, x) ∈ (t, t∗)× R. (A.9)
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Consequently, the following PDE holds:
{
Gpˆit (t, x, α) +
1
2
Gpˆix (t, x, α)ρ(t)
(
a0(t) + a1(t)x
)
= 0, t ∈ (t, t∗), x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit ,
limt↑t∗,x′→xGpˆit (t, x
′, α) = x, x ∈ R,
(A.10)
where
ρ(t) := 2b(t)⊤v∗(t)− ‖σ(t)⊤v∗(t)‖2. (A.11)
Lemma 5 shows that if pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium, then it must take the
form (A.9) in the time interval (t, t∗) and the quantile of the terminal wealth under pˆi ∈ A
satisfies the PDE (A.10). Note that this PDE is a linear transportation equation defined on
a possibly strict subset of (t, t∗) × R. In order to identify the equilibrium strategy pˆi, we
need to solve a0 and a1, so it is crucial to solve the transportation equation.
Lemma 6 Fix τ1 < τ2, c¯ ∈ R, c, γ0, γ1 ∈ C([τ1, τ2]) taking values in R, and α0, α1 ∈ R.
Define
gˆ(t, x) := α0 + α1
[∫ τ2
t
γ0(s)e
∫ τ2
s γ1(τ)dτds+ xe
∫ τ2
t γ1(s)ds
]
, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]× R. (A.12)
Denote X1,t := (c¯,+∞), X2,t := (−∞, c¯), and X3,t := (c(t),+∞), t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. For each
i = 1, 2, 3, define
Di = {(t, x) | x ∈ Xi,t, t ∈ [τ1, τ2)}, D¯i = {(t, x) | x ∈ Xi,t, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]},
denote by C1,1(D¯i) the set of real-valued functions that are continuous on D¯i and differentiable
on Di, and consider{
gt(t, x) + gx(t, x)(γ0(t) + γ1(t)x) = 0, (t, x) ∈ Di,
g(τ2, x) = α0 + α1x, x ∈ Xi,τ2 .
(A.13)
(i) If g ∈ C1,1(D¯1) is the solution to (A.13) with i = 1, then there exists x ≥ c¯ such that
g(t, x) = gˆ(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ1, τ2]× (x,+∞).
(ii) If g ∈ C1,1(D¯1) is the solution to (A.13) with i = 2, then there exists x¯ ≤ c¯ such that
g(t, x) = gˆ(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ1, τ2]× (−∞, x¯).
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(iii) If c(t) is decreasing in t ∈ [τ1, τ2], γ0(t)+γ1(t)x > 0 for all (t, x) ∈ D3, and g ∈ C1,1(D¯1)
is the solution to (A.13) with i = 3, then g(t, x) = gˆ(t, x), (t, x) ∈ D3.
Lemma 6 solves the linear transportation equation with affine terminal condition. The
solution is also an affine function of x for each t.
Lemma 7 Consider pˆi ∈ A, recall t∗, t∗, ξ, and Spˆit as defined in Lemma 2 and t as defined
in Lemma 4. Suppose t < t∗ and pˆi is an intra-personal equilibrium for a given α ∈ (0, 1),
and recall a0 and a1 as defined in Lemma 5. Define
β1(t, α) = e
1
2
∫ t∗
t
a1(s)ρ(s)ds, β0(t, α) :=
1
2
∫ t∗
t
a0(s)ρ(s)β1(s, α)ds, t ∈ [t, t∗]. (A.14)
Fix any t ∈ (t, t∗).
(i) There exists s ∈ [t, t∗) such that a1(s) 6= 0. Consequently,
∫ t∗
t
a1(s)
2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds > 0. (A.15)
(ii) If Xx0,pˆit ⊇ (xt,+∞) for certain xt ∈ R, then there exists ct > max(xt, ξ) such that
Gpˆi(s, x, α) = β1(s, α)x+ β0(s, α) (A.16)
for all (s, x) ∈ [t, t∗]× [ct,+∞). Moreover,
1
2
∫ t∗
t
a1(s)
(
1− a1(s)
)‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds+ Φ−1(α)
√∫ t∗
t
a1(s)2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds = 0.
(A.17)
(iii) If Xx0,pˆit ⊇ (−∞, x¯t) for certain x¯t ∈ R, then there exists c¯t < min(ξ, x¯t) such that
(A.16) holds all (s, x) ∈ [t, t∗]× (−∞, c¯t). Moreover,
1
2
∫ t∗
t
a1(s)
(
1− a1(s)
)‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds+ Φ−1(1− α)
√∫ t∗
t
a1(s)2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds = 0.
(A.18)
Lemma 5 already proved that an equilibrium strategy pˆi ∈ A must take the form (A.9)
with a0 and a1 undetermined. Lemma 7 provides a necessary condition for a1, which is then
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used in the following Proposition 8 to characterize equilibrium strategies for α 6= 1/2 and in
the following Proposition 9 to characterize equilibrium strategies for α = 1/2.
Proposition 8 For α ∈ (0, 1/2), pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium if and only if pˆi is
given by (3.4) for some θ ∈ Cpw([0, T )) taking values in Rm. For α ∈ (1/2, 1), any pˆi ∈ A is
not an intra-personal equilibrium.
Proposition 9 For α = 1/2, pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium if and only if it is
given by (3.3) for some ξ < x0.
A.1.4 Detailed Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose t∗ < t∗ and fix any t ∈ [t∗, t∗). By Proposition 13-(i), there exists
η ∈ (0, t∗ − t) such that F pˆi(s, x, y) ∈ C1,∞([t, t + η] × R2\(ξ, ξ)), F pˆit (s, x, y) ∈ C0,∞([t, t +
η] × R2\(ξ, ξ)), F pˆit is bounded on [t, t + η] × R2\(ξ, ξ), and the derivatives of F pˆi and F pˆit
with respect to x and y of any order are bounded on [t, t+ η]× R2\B2δ (ξ) for any δ > 0.
Fix π ∈ Rm. For any fixed x ∈ R, y 6= ξ, noting that F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, y) = E[F pˆi(t+ ǫ,Xπt,x(t+
ǫ), y)] and recalling that for any δ > 0, F pˆit and F
pˆi
x are bounded on [t, t+ η]×R2\B2δ (ξ), we
derive by the dominated convergence theorem that for any ǫ0 ∈ [0, η),
lim
ǫ→ǫ0
sup
x∈R,y∈R\Bδ(ξ)
∣∣F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, y)− F pˆit,ǫ0,π(t, x, y)∣∣ = 0.
The above, together with the continuity of F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, y) in y 6= ξ as implied by Proposition
13-(iii), yields that F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, y) is continuous in (ǫ, y) with ǫ ∈ [0, η) and y 6= ξ. Now, for
any x 6= ξ, Proposition 14-(ii) shows that for any α ∈ (0, 1), F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)) = α,
Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α) 6= ξ, and F pˆit,ǫ,πy (t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)) > 0. By Proposition 13-(iii), F pˆit,ǫ,πy (t, x, y)
is continuous in y 6= ξ. The implicit function theorem then yields that Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α) is
continuous in ǫ ∈ [0, η).
Fixing x ∈ R, because Gpˆit,0,π(t, x, α) = Gpˆi(t, x, α) 6= ξ and because Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α) is
continuous in ǫ, there exists δ > 0 such that |Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)− ξ| > δ for sufficiently small ǫ.
Because the derivatives of F pˆi and F pˆit with respect to x and y of any orders are bounded on
[t, t+ η)× R2\B2δ (ξ), there exists L > 0 such that
sup
s∈[t,η)
∣∣AπF pˆi(s, x, y1)−AπF pˆi(s, x, y2)∣∣
≤ L(1 + |x|+ |x|2)|y1 − y2|, x ∈ R, (y1, y2) ∈ [ξ + δ,+∞)2 ∪ (−∞, ξ − δ]2. (A.19)
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Because E
[
sups∈[t,η) |Xπt,x(s)|p
]
< +∞ for any p ≥ 1, we conclude that from (A.19) that for
sufficiently small ǫ > 0,
E
[
sup
s∈[t,η)
∣∣AπF pˆi(s,Xπt,x(s), Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))−AπF pˆi(s,Xπt,x(s), Gpˆi(t, x, α))∣∣
]
≤ L′|Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)−Gpˆi(t, x, α)| (A.20)
for some constant L′ > 0. On the other hand, we have
F pˆit,ǫ,π
(
t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)
)− F pˆi (t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))
= E[F pˆi(t+ ǫ,Xπt,x(t + ǫ), G
pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))]− F pˆi (t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))
= AπF pˆi(t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α))ǫ+ E
[ ∫ t+ǫ
t
(
AπF pˆi(s,Xπt,x(s), Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))
−AπF pˆi(s,Xπt,x(s), Gpˆi(t, x, α))
)
ds
]
+ E
[∫ t+ǫ
t
(
AπF pˆi(s,Xπt,x(s), Gpˆi(t, x, α))−AπF pˆi(t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α))
)
ds
]
.
Combining the above with (A.20), recalling that F pˆit , F
pˆi
x , and F
pˆi
xx are bounded on [t, t +
η) × R2\B2δ (ξ), noting that E
[
sups∈[t,η) |Xπt,x(s)|p
]
< +∞ for any p ≥ 1, and applying the
dominated convergence theorem, we conclude that
lim
ǫ↓0
F pˆit,ǫ,π
(
t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)
)− F pˆi (t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))
ǫ
= AπF pˆi(t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α)).
(A.21)
Because F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α)) = α for any ǫ ∈ [0, η), we conclude that
0 =
F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))− F pˆi(t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))
ǫ
+
F pˆi(t, x, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α))− F pˆi(t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α))
ǫ
.
Because F pˆiy is continuous on [t, t + η)× R2\(ξ, ξ), Gpˆi(t, x, α) 6= ξ, and F pˆiy (t, x, y) > 0 for y
with F pˆi(t, x, y) ∈ (0, 1), the above and (A.21) immediately lead to the first two equality in
(A.4). In addition, Proposition 13-(i) shows that ApˆiF pˆi(s, x, y) = 0 on [t, t+ η)×R2\(ξ, ξ)).
The last equality in (A.4) then follows.
Suppose t∗ > 0 and fix t ∈ [0, t∗). By Proposition 13-(ii), there exists η ∈ (0, t∗ − t)
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such that F pˆi(s, x, y) ∈ C1,∞([t, t + η) × R2, F pˆit (s, x, y) ∈ C0,∞([t, t + η) × R2, the deriva-
tives of F pˆi with respect to x and y of any order are bounded on [t, t + η) × R2, and
sups∈[t,t+η),y∈R |∂
i+jF pˆit
∂xi∂yj
(s, x, y)| is of polynomial growth in x for any i, j ∈ N0. The remaining
proof then follows the same line as for the case t ∈ [t∗, t∗). 
Proof of Proposition 7 We first consider the case α = 1/2. It is straightforward to see that
d(X pˆi0,x0(s)− ξ) = (X pˆi0,x0(s)− ξ)
[
v∗(s)⊤b(s)ds+ v∗(s)⊤σ(s)dW (s)
]
, s ∈ [0, T )
and X pˆi0,x0(0) − ξ = x0 − ξ > 0. Because v∗(s) 6= 0 and σ(s)σ(s)⊤ is positive definition,
s ∈ [0, T ), we conclude Xx0,pˆi0 = {x0} and Xx0,pˆit = (ξ,+∞), t ∈ (0, T ). For every t ∈ [0, T ),
by the definition of v∗(t), Qv∗(t) ≥ 0. Because X pˆi0,x0(t) > ξ, we immediately conclude
Qpˆi(t, X pˆi0,x0(t)) ≥ 0. In addition, v∗(t) is bounded in t ∈ [0, T ). Thus, pˆi ∈ Π.
Now, fix any t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Xx0,pˆit . Straightforward calculation shows that
F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2)) = − φ(0)√∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds(x− ξ)
< 0,
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2)) = −(x− ξ)−1F pˆix (t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, 1/2)) > 0.
Then, because v∗(t) is the optimal solution to (3.1), pˆi(t, x) = v∗(t)(x − ξ) is the unique
optimal solution of
{
min
π∈Rm
ϕpˆit,x,α(π)
subject to Qπ ≥ 0,
(A.22)
with α = 1/2, where ϕpˆit,x,α is defined by (A.5). As a result, for any π ∈ Rm with Qπ ≥ 0,
π 6= pˆi(t, x), Lemma 2 yields that
lim
ǫ↓0
Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, 1/2)−Gpˆi(t, x, 1/2)
ǫ
< 0.
Thus, pˆi is an equilibrium strategy.
Next, we consider the case α < 1/2. It is straightforward to see that X pˆi0,x0(t) ≡ x0 and
thus Xx0,pˆit = {x0}, t ∈ [0, T ]. As a result, pˆi(t, X pˆi0,x0(t)) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ). In addition, θ(t) is
bounded in t ∈ [0, T ). Thus, pˆi ∈ Π.
Fix any t ∈ [0, T ) and π ∈ Rm with π 6= pˆi(t, x0) = 0. For any ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), straightfor-
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ward calculation leads to
X
pˆit,ǫ,π
t,x0 (T )− x0
=
[∫ t+ǫ
t
b(s)⊤πds+
∫ t+ǫ
t
π⊤σ(s)dW (s)
]
e
∫ T
t+ǫ[b(τ)
⊤θ(τ)− 1
2
‖σ(τ)⊤θ(τ)‖2]dτ+∫ Tt+ǫ θ(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ).
(A.23)
As a result,
F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x0, x0) = P(X
pˆit,ǫ,π
t,x0 (T ) ≤ x0) = P
(∫ t+ǫ
t
b(s)⊤πds+
∫ t+ǫ
t
π⊤σ(s)dW (s) ≤ 0
)
= Φ

 − ∫ t+ǫt b(s)⊤πds√∫ t+ǫ
t
‖σ(s)⊤π‖2ds

 . (A.24)
Because α < 1/2, the right-hand side of the above is strictly larger than α when ǫ is suf-
ficiently small. As a result, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x0, α) ≤ x0 for sufficiently small ǫ. Thus, pˆi is an
equilibrium strategy. 
Proof of Lemma 3 For any t ∈ [0, t∗) and x ∈ Xx0,pˆit and for any t ∈ [t∗, t∗) and x ∈ Xx0,pˆit
with x 6= ξ, Lemma 2 implies that
ϕpˆit,x,α(pˆi(t, x)) ≤ ϕpˆit,x,α(π), ∀π 6= pˆi(t, x) with Qπ ≥ 0 (A.25)
Proposition 13-(iv) shows that F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) < 0. On the other hand, because of
Assumption 2, we can find v0 ∈ Rm with Qv0 ≥ 0 such that b(t)⊤v0 > 0. Then Q(λv0) ≥ 0
for any λ > 0. If F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) ≤ 0, we consider λv0 for sufficiently large, positive
scalar λ so that λv0 6= pˆi(t, x) and ϕpˆit,x,α(pˆi(t, x)) > ϕpˆit,x,α(λv0), which contradicts (A.25).
Thus, we must have F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) > 0. Then, (A.25) immediately implies that
−pˆi(t, x)F pˆixx(t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α))/F pˆix (t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, α))
is the optimizer of (3.1), i.e., (A.6) holds. 
Proof of Lemma 4 If t = T , then it is obvious that t ≥ t∗. On the other hand, by the
definition of t∗, θ0(τ) + θ1(τ)x0 = 0, τ ∈ [t∗, T ). Thus, t ≥ t∗ implies t = T .
Next, we fix α ∈ [1/2, 1). For the sake of contradiction, suppose t∗ < T . Then, for any
t ∈ [t∗, T ) and x ∈ Xx0,pˆit , we have pˆi(t, x) = 0. Choose any π ∈ Rm with b(t)⊤π > 0 and
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Qπ ≥ 0. Note that such π exists due to Assumption 2. Then, we must have π 6= 0 = pˆi(t, x).
For any ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), straightforward calculation leads to
X
pˆit,ǫ,π
t,x (T ) = x+
∫ t+ǫ
t
b(s)⊤πds+
∫ t+ǫ
t
π⊤σ(s)dW (s).
Because α ≥ 1/2, b(t)⊤π > 0, and b is right-continuous, straightforward calculation shows
that for sufficiently small ǫ > 0, Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x, α) > x = Gpˆi(t, x, α). This contradicts the
assumption that pˆi is an equilibrium strategy. Thus, we must have t∗ = T .
Next, for the sake of contradiction, suppose t > 0. Then, X pˆi0,x0(s) = x0 and thus X
x0,pˆi
s =
{x0} for all s ∈ [0, t). Recall t∗ as defined in (A.2) and θ0(s)+θ1(s)ξ = 0, s ∈ [t∗, t∗) = [t∗, T )
for certain uniquely determined ξ ∈ R. When t∗ > 0 we can choose any t ∈ [0, t∗ ∧ t) and
when ξ 6= x0 we can choose any t ∈ [0, t). In either case, Lemma 3 can apply to this particular
t together with x0 ∈ Xx0,pˆit , leading to F pˆix (t, x0, Gpˆi(t, x0, α)) < 0, F pˆixx(t, x0, Gpˆi(t, x0, α)) > 0,
and
pˆi(t, x0) = −F
pˆi
x (t, x0, G
pˆi(t, x0, α))
F pˆixx(t, x0, G
pˆi(t, x0, α))
v∗(t).
The above is a contradiction because pˆi(t, x0) = 0 and v
∗(t) 6= 0.
When t∗ = 0 and ξ = x0, we have t = T and thus Xx0,pˆis = {x0} and X pˆis,x0(T ) = X pˆi0,x0(T )
for all s ∈ [0, t). Fix any t ∈ [0, T ) and choose any π ∈ Rm with b(t)⊤π > 0 and Qπ ≥ 0,
and such π can be found due to Assumption 2. For any ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), (A.24) holds. Thus,
because α ≥ 1/2, for sufficiently small ǫ > 0, F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x0, x0) < α. In addition, because
π 6= 0, F pˆit,ǫ,π(t, x0, y) is strictly increasing and continuous in y for any ǫ ∈ (0, T − t).
Consequently, we conclude that Gpˆit,ǫ,π(t, x0, α) > x0 = G
pˆi(t, x0, α) for sufficiently small
ǫ > 0. This contradicts the assumption that pˆi is an equilibrium policy. The proof then
completes. 
Proof of Lemma 5 Part (i) is an immediate consequence of Proposition 12-(iii) and (iv).
We prove part (ii) in the following.
Fix any t ∈ (t, t∗), Lemma 4 implies that
−F
pˆi
x (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
v∗(t) = pˆi(t, x) = θ0(t) + θ1(t)x, x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit . (A.26)
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Multiplying v∗(t)⊤ on both sides of the above equality and noting that v∗(t) 6= 0, we conclude
−F
pˆi
x (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
= ‖v∗(t)‖−2 (v∗(t)⊤θ0(t) + v∗(t)⊤θ1(t)x) , x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit .
Then,
[(
−F
pˆi
x (t, x
′, Gpˆi(t, x′, α))
F pˆixx(t, x
′, Gpˆi(t, x′, α))
)
−
(
−F
pˆi
x (t, x
′′, Gpˆi(t, x′′, α))
F pˆixx(t, x
′′, Gpˆi(t, x′′, α))
)]
/(x′ − x′′)
does not depend on the choice of x′, x′′ ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit with x′ 6= x′′, and we denote this common
value by a1(t). Because X
x0,pˆi
t is a nonempty open interval and S
pˆi
t is either the empty set or
a singleton, we can always find x′, x′′ ∈ Spˆit with x′ 6= x′′ and thus a1(t) is well defined. Then,
fixing any x¯ ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit , we have
−F
pˆi
x (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
− a1(t)x = −F
pˆi
x (t, x¯, G
pˆi(t, x¯, α))
F pˆixx(t, x¯, G
pˆi(t, x¯, α))
− a1(t)x¯, x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit .
It is obvious that the right-hand side does not depend on the choice of x¯, and we denote it
by a0(t). Consequently,
−F
pˆi
x (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
= a0(t) + a1(t)x, x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit .
Combining the above with (A.26), we immediately conclude that θ0(t) = a0(t)v
∗(t) and
θ1(t) = a1(t)v
∗(t).
Next, we prove that a0, a1 ∈ C([t, t∗]). For any fixed t1 ∈ (t, t∗), because Xx0,pˆit1 is a
nonempty interval, we can find distinct x′ 6= x′′ ∈ Xx0,pˆit1 \{ξ} ⊆ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit , t ∈ [t1, t∗). Then,
we have
a1(t) =
[(
−F
pˆi
x (t, x
′, Gpˆi(t, x′, α))
F pˆixx(t, x
′, Gpˆi(t, x′, α))
)
−
(
−F
pˆi
x (t, x
′′, Gpˆi(t, x′′, α))
F pˆixx(t, x
′′, Gpˆi(t, x′′, α))
)]
/(x′ − x′′), t ∈ [t1, t∗).
By Proposition 13-(iii), F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) and F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) are continuous in t ∈
[0, t∗) for any x 6= ξ. As a result, a1 ∈ C([t1, t∗)). Similarly, a0 ∈ C([t1, t∗);R). Because t1 is
arbitrary, we have a0, a1 ∈ C((t, t∗)). For any t ∈ (t, t∗), because θ1(t) = a1(t)v∗(t), we have
a1(t) = θ1(t)
⊤v∗(t)/‖v∗(t)‖2. Because the limits of v∗(t) and θ1(t) exist when t converges to
t and because the former limit is not zero, we conclude that the limit of a1(t) as t goes to t
exists. Similarly, the limit of a1(t) as t goes to t
∗ exists. Thus, we can extend the definition
of a1 to the domain [t, t
∗] and a1 ∈ C([t, t∗]). Similarly, we can show that a0 ∈ C([t, t∗]).
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Finally, for any t ∈ (t, t∗) and x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit , Proposition 13-(i) and (ii) yield that
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) + F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))b(t)⊤pˆi(t, x) +
1
2
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))‖σ(t)pˆi(t, x)‖2 = 0.
Combining the above with (A.8) and (A.9) and noting that F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) 6= 0 and
thus a0(t) + a1(t)x 6= 0, we obtain
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) +
1
2
F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))ρ(t)
(
a0(t) + a1(t)x
)
= 0.
Proposition 14-(ii) and (iii) show that
Gpˆix (t, x, α) = −
F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
, Gpˆit (t, x, α) = −
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
.
As a result, we derive
Gpˆit (t, x, α) +
1
2
Gpˆix (t, x, α)ρ(t)
(
a0(t) + a1(t)x
)
= 0.
Proposition 14-(iv) shows that for any x ∈ R,
lim
t↑t∗,x′→x
Gpˆi(t, x′, α) = x.
The proof then completes. 
Proof of Lemma 6 We prove (i) first. Because γ0, γ1 ∈ C([τ1, τ2]), there exists L > 0 such
that sups∈[τ1,τ2] |γi(s)| ≤ L, i = 0, 1. Set
x := eL(τ2−τ1)
(
c¯ + LeL(τ2−τ1)(τ2 − τ1)
)
.
Fix any t ∈ [τ1, τ2) and x > x, consider
ϕ(s) = g(s, h1(s)x+ h0(s)), s ∈ [t, τ2],
where
h0(s) =
∫ s
t
e
∫ s
τ γ1(z)dzγ0(τ)dτ, h1(s) = e
∫ s
t γ1(τ)dτ , s ∈ [t, τ2].
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Straightforward calculation yields
h′1(s)x+ h
′
0(s) = γ0(s) + γ1(s)
(
h1(s)x+ h0(s)
)
, s ∈ [t, τ2]. (A.27)
For any s ∈ [t, τ2],
h1(s)x+ h0(s) ≥ e−L(τ2−τ1)x− LeL(τ2−τ1)(τ2 − τ1) > e−L(τ2−τ1)x− LeL(τ2−τ1)(τ2 − τ1) = c¯,
where the first inequality is the case because sups∈[τ1,τ2] |γi(s)| ≤ L, i = 0, 1 and the second
inequality is the case because x > x. Therefore, ϕ(s), s ∈ [t, τ2] is well defined and is
differentiable in s ∈ [t, τ2). Moreover, applying the chain rule, we derive
ϕ′(s) = gt(s, h1(s)x+ h0(s)) + gx(s, h1(s)x+ h0(s))
(
h′1(s)x+ h
′
0(s)
)
= gt(s, h1(s)x+ h0(s)) + gx(s, h1(s)x+ h0(s))
(
h1(s)γ1(s)x+ γ0(s) + h0(s)γ1(s)
)
= 0, s ∈ [t, τ2),
where the second equality follows from (A.27) and the third follows from the differentiable
equation satisfied by g. As a result,
g(t, x) = ϕ(t) = ϕ(τ2) = g (τ2, h1(τ2)x+ h0(τ2)) = α0 + α1 (h1(τ2)x+ h0(τ2)) = gˆ(t, x),
where the fourth equality is the case due to the terminal condition satisfied by g at τ2.
Part (ii) can be proved similarly. For (iii), because γ0(t)+γ1(t)x ≥ 0 for all (t, x) ∈ D3 and
because c(t) is decreasing, for each fixed (t, x) ∈ D3, (A.27) shows that h′1(s)x+ h′0(s) ≥ 0,
h1(s)x+ h0(s) is increasing in s ∈ [t, τ2] and thus (s, h1(s)x+ h0(s)) ∈ D3, s ∈ [t, τ2). Then,
following the same proof as in part (i) of the lemma, we conclude that g(t, x) = gˆ(t, x). 
Proof of Lemma 7 Recall the form of the strategy pˆi as in (A.9). Suppose Xx0,pˆit ⊇ (xt,+∞)
for certain xt ∈ R. Then, ξ /∈ [x′t,+∞) for certain x′t ≥ xt and (A.10) holds in the region
[t, t∗]×(x′t,+∞). Because Gpˆi ∈ C([t, t∗]×(x′t,+∞)) (due to Proposition 14-(ii)) and because
there exists a partition of [t, t∗], t =: τ0 < τ1 < · · · < τN = t∗, such that a0, a1, ρ ∈ C([τi−1, τi])
and Gpˆi ∈ C1,∞([τi−1, τi)× (x′t,+∞)) (due to Proposition 14-(iii)) i = 1, . . . , N , by applying
Lemma 6 in [τi−1, τi) sequentially, we conclude that there exists ct > max(xt, ξ) such that
(A.16) holds all (s, x) ∈ [t, t∗]× [ct,+∞). Similarly, in the case Xx0,pˆit ⊇ (−∞, x¯t) for certain
x¯t ∈ R, we can find c¯t < min(ξ, x¯t) such that (A.16) holds all (s, x) ∈ [t, t∗]× (−∞, c¯t).
Next, we prove (i). For the sake of contradiction, suppose a1(s) = 0, s ∈ [t, t∗). Then,
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we must have t∗ = t∗; otherwise θ0(s) = −ξθ1(s) = −ξa1(s)v∗(s) = 0 for s ∈ [t∗, t∗),
contradicting the definition of t∗. Moreover, by the definition of t∗, for any s ∈ [t, t∗), there
exists τ ∈ [s, t∗) with θ0(τ) 6= 0 and thus a0(τ) 6= 0. Also note that
X pˆis,x(T ) = x+
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)v
∗(τ)⊤b(τ)dτ +
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)v
∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ),
which is a normal random variable. Thus, we have
Gpˆi(s, x, α) = x+
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)v
∗(τ)⊤b(τ)dτ + Φ−1(α)
√∫ t∗
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2a0(τ)2dτ. (A.28)
Lemma 5-(i) shows that it is either the case in which Xx0,pˆit = (xt,+∞) for certain xt ∈ R,
or the case in which Xx0,pˆit = (−∞, x¯t) for certain x¯t ∈ R, or the case Xx0,pˆit = R. In either
case, as we already proved, there exists a nonempty open interval I ⊂ R such that (A.16)
holds for any s ∈ [t, t∗) and x ∈ I. Comparing (A.16) and (A.28), we conclude
β0(s, α) =
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)v
∗(τ)⊤b(τ)dτ + Φ−1(α)
√∫ t∗
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2a0(τ)2dτ,
β1(s, α) = 1, s ∈ [t, t∗).
The above immediately yields that a1(s) = 0, s ∈ [t, t∗) and
− Φ−1(α)
√∫ t∗
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2a0(τ)2dτ =
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)v
∗(τ)⊤b(τ)dτ − 1
2
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)ρ(τ)dτ
=
1
2
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ, s ∈ [t, t∗), (A.29)
where the second equality is due to the definition of ρ. When α = 1/2, because ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2 >
0, s ∈ [0, T ), (A.29) implies that a0(s) = 0, s ∈ [t, t∗), which is a contradiction. When
α 6= 1/2, taking square and then taking derivative with respect to s on both sides of (A.29),
and noting that ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2 > 0, s ∈ [0, T ) and that a0(s) > 0, s ∈ [t, t∗) because of (A.8)
and a1(s) = 0, s ∈ [t, t∗), we derive the following integral equation
(
Φ−1(α)
)2
a0(s)− 1
2
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ = 0, s ∈ [t, t∗).
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Then, g(s) :=
∫ t∗
s
a0(τ)‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ = 0 satisfies
(
Φ−1(α)
)2
g′(s) +
1
2
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2g(s) = 0, s ∈ [t, t∗), g(t∗) = 0.
Because
(
Φ−1(α)
)2 6= 0 and ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖ is bounded in s ∈ [t, t∗), we derive g(s) = 0, s ∈
[t, t∗], i.e., a0(s) = 0, s ∈ [t, t∗], which is a contradiction.
Next, we suppose Xx0,pˆit ⊇ (xt,+∞) for certain xt ∈ R and prove (A.17). Straightforward
calculation yields that
X pˆit,x(T ) = xZ˜1(T ; t) + Z˜2(T ; t).
where
dZ˜1(s; t) = Z˜1(s; t)
[
b(s)⊤θ1(s)ds+ θ1(s)⊤σ(s)dW (s)
]
, s ∈ [t, T ], Z˜1(t; t) = 1. (A.30)
dZ˜2(s; t) =
(
b(s)⊤θ0(s) + b(s)⊤θ1(s)Z˜2(s; t)
)
ds+
(
θ0(s)
⊤σ(s) + θ1(s)⊤σ(s)Z˜2(s; t)
)
dW (s),
s ∈ [t, T ], Z˜2(t; t) = 0. (A.31)
For any x > max(ct, 0), denote by G
Z(α), α ∈ (0, 1) and GY (x, α), α ∈ (0, 1) the right-
continuous quantile functions of Z˜1(T ; t) and Y
pˆi
t,x(T ) := X
pˆi
t,x(T )/x, respectively. We already
proved part (i) of the lemma, which implies that Z˜1(T ; t) is a non-degenerate lognormal ran-
dom variable and thus its quantile function is continuous. Also note that limx↑+∞ Y pˆit,x(T ) =
Z˜1(T ; t) almost surely. As a result,
lim
x↑+∞
Gpˆi(t, x, α)
x
= lim
x↑+∞
GY (x, α) = GZ(α), ∀α ∈ (0, 1).
By computing GZ(α) from (A.30) and recalling (A.16), we then derive (A.17).
Finally, (A.18) can be proved similarly. 
Proof of Proposition 8 Suppose that pˆi ∈ A is an equilibrium strategy for certain α 6= 1/2.
Recall t∗ as defined in Lemma 2 and t as defined in Lemma 4. We prove that it cannot be
the case that t < t∗.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose t < t∗. Combining Lemma 5-(i) and Lemma 7, we
conclude that it is either the case in which (A.17) holds for any t ∈ (t, t∗) or the case in which
(A.18) holds for any t ∈ (t, t∗). Denote λ = Φ−1(α) in the first case and λ = Φ−1(1 − α) in
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the second case. Cauchy’s inequality implies
∣∣∣∣
∫ t∗
t
a1(s)‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
∣∣∣∣ ≤
√∫ t∗
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
√∫ t∗
t
a1(s)2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds.
Combining the above with (A.17) and (A.18), we obtain
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t∗
t
a1(s)
2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds− 2λ
√∫ t∗
t
a1(s)2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
√∫ t∗
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
√∫ t∗
t
a1(s)2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds.
Because of (A.15), we can divide
√∫ t∗
t
a1(s)2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds on both sides of the above
inequality to obtain
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√∫ t∗
t
a1(s)2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds− 2λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√∫ t∗
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds.
Sending t to t∗ on both sides of the above inequality and noting that λ 6= 0 because α 6= 1/2,
we arrive at contradiction.
We already proved that t ≥ t∗. On the other hand, Lemma 4 shows that if pˆi ∈ A is an
equilibrium strategy for α ∈ (1/2, 1), we must have t = 0 and t∗ = T . Thus, any pˆi ∈ A is
not an equilibrium strategy for α ∈ (1/2, 1). For α ∈ (0, 1/2), by Lemma 4, t ≥ t∗ implies
t = T , which is the case if and only if pˆi(s, x0) = 0, s ∈ [0, T ), i.e., pˆi takes the form in
(3.4). On the other hand, we already proved that any pˆi as given by (3.4) is an equilibrium
strategy. The proof then completes. 
Proof of Proposition 9 Suppose that pˆi ∈ A is an equilibrium strategy for certain α = 1/2.
Recall t∗ as defined in Lemma 2 and t as defined in Lemma 4. Lemma 4 shows that t = 0
and t∗ = T . Then, Lemma 7-(ii) and (iii) imply that
1
2
∫ t∗
t
a1(s)
(
1− a1(s)
)‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds = 0, t ∈ (0, t∗),
which implies that a1(t)(1 − a1(t)) = 0, t ∈ (0, t∗). Lemma 7-(i) shows for any t ∈ (0, t∗),
a1(s) 6= 0 for some s ∈ [t, t∗). Then we must have a1(t) = 1, t ∈ (0, T ) because a1 ∈
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C([0, T ];R) as shown by Lemma 5-(ii). Then, (A.9) implies that
pˆi(t, x) = (a0(t) + x)v
∗(t), t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R. (A.32)
What remains is to prove that a0(t) is constant in t ∈ [0, T ].
According to Lemma 5-(i), (A.8), and a1(t) = 1, t ∈ (0, T ), we have Xx0,pˆit = (x(t),+∞)
for some x(t) ∈ R. Because of (A.32), Proposition 12-(iv) shows that a0(t) is increasing
in t ∈ (0, T ] and Xx0,pˆit = (−a0(t),+∞), t ∈ (0, T ]. By the definition of t∗ and ξ, we have
t∗ = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : a0(s) = a0(T ), s ∈ [t, T ]} and ξ = −a0(T ). Because a0(t) is increasing
in t ∈ (0, T ], we conclude that Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit = (−a0(t),+∞), t ∈ (0, T ]. Now, Lemma 5-(ii) and
Lemma 6-(iii) yield that (A.16) holds for any x > −a0(t), t ∈ (0, T ].
Now, for the sake of contradiction, suppose a0(t) is not constant in t ∈ [0, T ], which is
equivalent to t∗ > 0. Fix any t ∈ (0, t∗). Then, a0(s) is not a constant in s ∈ [t, t∗], which
means that da0(s) defines a positive measure on [t, T ]. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma, recalling
(A.32), Lemma 1 and Z˜1 as in (A.30), and noting that a0 ∈ C([0, T ]) and a1 ≡ 1, we derive
d
(
a0(s) +X
pˆi
t,x(s)
Z˜1(s; t)
)
=
da0(s)
Z˜1(s; t)
, s ∈ [t, T ), x ∈ R.
Then, we obtain
X pˆit,−a0(t)(T ) = −a0(T ) +
∫ T
t
Z˜1(T ; t)
Z˜1(s; t)
da0(s),
= −a0(T ) +
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
s (b(τ)⊤v∗(τ)− 12‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ)dτ+
∫ T
s v
∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ)da0(s), (A.33)
where the second equality is the case due to the definition of Z˜1 and because a1(s) = 1 and
thus θ1(s) = v
∗(s), s ∈ [0, T ). Then, recalling t∗ = T , β0, β1 as defined in (A.14), and that
ρ(s) = 2b(s)⊤v∗(s)− ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2, we derive
X pˆit,−a0(t)(T ) + a0(t)β1(t, 1/2)− β0(t, 1/2)
= −a0(T ) +
∫ T
t
e
1
2
∫ T
s
ρ(τ)dτ+
∫ T
s
v∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ)da0(s)
+ a0(t)e
1
2
∫ T
t
ρ(s)ds − 1
2
∫ T
t
a0(s)ρ(s)e
1
2
∫ T
s
ρ(τ)dτds
=
∫ T
t
e
1
2
∫ T
s
ρ(τ)dτ+
∫ T
s
v∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ)da0(s)−
∫ T
t
e
1
2
∫ T
s
ρ(τ)dτda0(s), (A.34)
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where second equality is the case because
d
(
a0(s)e
1
2
∫ T
s ρ(τ)dτ
)
= e
1
2
∫ T
s ρ(τ)dτda0(s)− 1
2
ρ(s)e
1
2
∫ T
s ρ(τ)dτa0(s)ds.
Next, we prove
P
(
X pˆit,−a0(t)(T ) ≤ −a0(t)β1(t, 1/2) + β0(t, 1/2)
)
< 1/2. (A.35)
According to (A.34), one can see that (A.35) is equivalent to
P
(∫ T
t
(
eM(s) − 1) dµ(s) ≤ 0) < 1/2, (A.36)
where M(s) :=
∫ T
s
v∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ) and dµ(s) := e
1
2
∫ T
s ρ(τ)dτda0(s), s ∈ [0, T ]. Because
da0(s) is a positive, atomless measure on [t, T ], so is dµ(s). In the following, we first prove
that
P
(∫ T
t
(
eM(s) − 1) dµ(s) > 0, ∫ T
t
M(s)ds ≤ 0
)
> 0. (A.37)
To this end, we first construct a pathm(s), s ∈ [t, T ] of the stochastic processM(s), s ∈ [0, T ]
such that
∫ T
t
(
em(s) − 1) dµ(s) > 0, ∫ T
t
m(s)dµ(s) < 0. (A.38)
The construction is as follows: First, there exists ζ1 ∈ R such that
∫ T
t
(T−s)(ζ1−s)dµ(s) = 0.
Because ex − 1 > x for any x 6= 0 and because dµ(s) is a positive, atomless measure
on [t, T ], we have
∫ T
t
(
e(T−s)(ζ1−s) − 1) dµ(s) > 0. Thus, there exists ζ2 < ζ1 such that∫ T
t
(
e(T−s)(ζ2−s) − 1) dµ(s) > 0. As a result,
∫ T
t
(T − s)(ζ2 − s)dµ(s) =
∫ T
t
(T − s)(ζ1 − s)dµ(s) + (ζ2 − ζ1)
∫ T
t
(T − s)dµ(s) < 0,
where the inequality is the case because ζ2 < ζ1 and
∫ T
t
(T − s)dµ(s) > 0. Thus, setting
m(s) := (T − s)(ζ2 − s), s ∈ [0, T ], (A.38) holds. As a result, there exists ǫ > 0 such that
∫ T
t
(
em(s)−ǫ − 1) dµ(s) > 0, ∫ T
t
(m(s) + ǫ)dµ(s) < 0. (A.39)
40
Define Y (s) := M(t)−M(s) = ∫ s
t
v∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ), s ∈ [t, T ] and
f(s) := m(t)−m(s) = (T − t)(ζ2 − t)− (T − s)(ζ2 − s), s ∈ [0, T ],
so f can be considered to be a path of Y . Defining an absolutely continuous function
w(s), s ∈ [0, T ] by
w(t) = 0, w′(s) =
σ(s)⊤v∗(s)
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2f
′(s), s ∈ [t, T ],
so we have f(s) =
∫ s
t
v∗(z)⊤σ(z)w′(z)dz, s ∈ [0, T ]. Then, Lemma 2 of He and Jiang (2020)
shows that f(s), s ∈ [t, T ] is in the support of Y (s), s ∈ [t, T ], with the latter being viewed
as a random variable taking values in the space of continuous functions on [t, T ] with the
maximum norm. As a result, for any ǫ > 0, in particular the one satisfying (A.39), we have
P
(
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|M(s)−m(s)| < ǫ
)
= P
(
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y (T )− Y (s)− (f(T )− f(s))| < ǫ
)
≥ P
(
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y (s)− f(s)| < ǫ/2
)
> 0.
Combining the above with (A.39), we derive
P
(∫ T
t
(
eM(s) − 1) dµ(s) > 0, ∫ T
t
M(s)ds ≤ 0
)
≥ P
(
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|M(s)−m(s)| < ǫ
)
> 0,
i.e., (A.37) is proved.
Now, recalling that (A.37) and noting that
∫ T
t
(
eM(s) − 1) dµ(s) ≥ ∫ T
t
M(s)dµ(s) because
ex − 1 ≥ x for any x ∈ R, we derive
P
(∫ T
t
(
eM(s) − 1) dµ(s) ≤ 0)
=P
(∫ T
t
M(s)dµ(s) ≤ 0
)
− P
(∫ T
t
M(s)dµ(s) ≤ 0,
∫ T
t
(
eM(s) − 1) dµ(s) > 0)
<P
(∫ T
t
M(s)dµ(s) ≤ 0
)
= 1/2,
where the last equality is the case because
∫ T
t
M(s)dµ(s) is a normal random variable with
zero mean. Thus, (A.35) is proved.
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Because t < t∗, Proposition 14-(ii) shows that Gpˆi(t, x, α) is continuous in (x, α) ∈
R × (0, 1). Then, we conclude from (A.35) and Proposition 14-(ii) that Gpˆi(t,−a0(t), 12) −
[β0(t,
1
2
)− a0(t)β1(t, 12)] > 0, and there exists δt > 0 such that
Gpˆi(t, x, 1/2)− (β0(t, 1/2) + xβ1(t, 1/2)) > 0, ∀x ∈ (−a0(t)− δt,−a0(t) + δt). (A.40)
Because have shown that (A.16) holds for any x > −a0(t), we arrive at contradiction. Then,
a0(t) must be a constant on [0, T ], i.e., pˆi must be given by (3.3) for some ξ < x0.
On the other hand, we already proved that pˆi as given by (3.3) for any ξ < x0 is an
equilibrium strategy. The proof then completes. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we present the proof of Theorem 2 by summarizing
important intermediate steps of the proof as lemmas and relegate all proofs in Section A.2.1.
Lemma 8 Fixed T1 ∈ [0, T ). Consider pˆi ∈ A and for any x ∈ R and t ∈ [T1, T ], denote by
X
x,T1,pˆi
t the set of reachable states of X
pˆi
T1,x
(t). Then, for any x1 ∈ Xx0,pˆiT1 , we have Xx1,T1,pˆit ⊆
X
x0,pˆi
t for any t ∈ [T1, T ].
Lemma 8 shows that any state that is reachable at given future time by a wealth equation
starting from an intermediate time and state that is reachable from the initial wealth is also
reachable from the initial wealth. As a result, if pˆi is an intrapersonal equilibrium at the
initial time, it is also an intrapersonal equilibrium at intermediate time.
Proposition 10 For α ∈ (0, 1/2), pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for the multiple-
time-point for α-level quantile maximization if and only if pˆi is given by (3.4) for some
θ ∈ Cpw([0, T )) taking values in Rm. For α ∈ (1/2, 1), any pˆi ∈ A is not an intra-personal
equilibrium for multiple-time-point α-level quantile maximization.
Proposition 10 shows that Theorem 2-(ii) and (iii) are true. In the following, we deal
with the remaining case α = 1/2, i.e. the case of median maximization. To this end, for any
pˆi ∈ A, define
τ ∗ : = inf{t ∈ [0, TN−1) : θ0(s) = θ1(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t, TN−1)}, (A.41)
τ∗ : = inf{t ∈ [0, τ ∗) : θ0(s) + ξ1θ1(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t, τ ∗) and some ξ1 ∈ R}. (A.42)
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Then, there exists unique ξ1 ∈ R such that θ0(s) + ξ1θ1(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [τ∗, τ ∗). Denote
S˜
pˆi
t = ∅, t ∈ [0, τ∗), S˜pˆit = {ξ1}, t ∈ [τ∗, TN−1). (A.43)
Recall t∗, t∗, and ξ as defined in Lemma 2. Recalling that Spˆit = ∅, ∀t ∈ [0, t∗), we derive that
Spˆit ⊆ S˜pˆit , ∀t ∈ [0, TN−1) because we have ξ1 = ξ and t∗ = τ∗ in the case t∗ < TN−1.
Lemma 9 Suppose pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for the multiple-time-point me-
dian maximization. Then, the left end of Xx0,pˆiTN−1 is finite and
pˆi(t, x) = v∗(t)(x− ξ), t ∈ [TN−1, T ), x ∈ R (A.44)
for some constant ξ that satisfies
ξ < x, ∀x ∈ Xx0,pˆiTN−1 . (A.45)
Recall t∗, t∗, ξ, and Spˆit as defined in Lemma 2 and τ
∗, τ∗, and ξ1 as defined in (A.41) and
(A.42). Then, τ ∗ = TN−1, t∗ = T , and t∗ ≤ TN−1.
Lemma 9 shows that if pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for the multiple-time-point
median maximization, it must be a portfolio insurance strategy in the period [TN−1, T ), and
the portfolio insurance level must be lower than any wealth level that is reachable at time
TN−1.
Denote by Fpi(t, x, y; s) := P(Xpit,x(s) ≤ y), y ∈ R the cumulative distribution function of
the wealth at time s given wealth level of x at time t ≤ s.
Lemma 10 Recall t as defined in Lemma 4 and S˜pˆit as in (A.43). Suppose pˆi ∈ A is an intra-
personal equilibrium for multiple-time-point median maximization. For any t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1),
x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \S˜pˆit , denoting
λpˆi1 (t, x) = (1− wN−1,N)
F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1);TN−1)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1);TN−1)
+ wN−1,N
F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
))
,
λpˆi2 (t, x) = (1− wN−1,N)
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1);TN−1)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1);TN−1)
+ wN−1,N
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
))
,
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we have λpˆi2 (t, x) > 0, λ
pˆi
1 (t, x) < 0, and
pˆi(t, x) = −λ
pˆi
1 (t, x)
λpˆi2 (t, x)
v∗(t). (A.46)
Moreover, we have t ≤ TN−2.
Lemma 10 shows that any intra-personal equilibrium pˆi ∈ A must take a particular form
as in (A.46) in the period [TN−2, TN−1): the allocation across the risky assets in this period
is the same as the Kelly strategy.
Lemma 11 Suppose pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for the multiple-time-point
median maximization problem. Recall ξ1 and S˜
pˆi
t as defined in (A.42) and (A.43), respectively.
Then,
(i) For each t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1], Xx0,pˆit = (x(t),+∞) for some x(t) < x0, and x(t) is decreas-
ing in t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1].
(ii) There exists a˜0, a˜1 ∈ C([TN−2, TN−1]) taking values in R such that
− λ
pˆi
1 (t, x)
λpˆi2 (t, x)
= a˜0(t) + a˜1(t)x > 0, t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1), x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \S˜pˆit , (A.47)
pˆi(t, x) =
(
a˜0(t) + a˜1(t)x
)
v∗(t), (t, x) ∈ (TN−2, TN−1)× R. (A.48)
Consequently, gpˆi(t, x) := wN−1,NGpˆi(t, x, 12) + (1 − wN−1,N)Gpˆi(t, x, 12 ;TN−1)satisfies
following PDE:


gpˆit (t, x) +
1
2
gpˆix (t, x)ρ(t)
(
a˜0(t) + a˜1(t)x
)
= 0, t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1), x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \S˜pˆit ,
lim
t↑TN−1,x′→x
gpˆi(t, x′) = wN−1,N
(
(x− ξ)e
∫ T
TN−1
1
2
ρ(s)ds
+ ξ
)
+ (1− wN−1,N)x, x ∈ R\{ξ},
(A.49)
where ρ(t) is as defined in (A.11).
Lemma 12 Suppose pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for the multiple-time-point
median maximization problem. Recall ξ1 and S˜
pˆi
t as defined in (A.42) and (A.43), respectively,
and a˜0, a˜1, and x(t) as defined in Lemma 11. Define
β˜1(t) : = e
1
2
∫ TN−1
t a˜1(s)ρ(s)ds, β˜0(t) :=
1
2
∫ TN−1
t
a˜0(s)ρ(s)β˜1(s)ds, t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1]. (A.50)
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Fix any t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1).
(i) There exists s ∈ [t, TN−1) such that a˜1(s) 6= 0. Consequently,
∫ TN−1
t
a˜1(s)
2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds > 0. (A.51)
(ii) There exists ct > max(x(t), ξ, ξ1) such that
wN−1,NGpˆi(s, x, 1/2) + (1− wN−1,N)Gpˆi(s, x, 1/2;TN−1)
= wN−1,N
(
β1(s, 1/2)x+ β0(s, 1/2)
)
+ (1− wN−1,N)
(
β˜1(s)x+ β˜0(s)
)
(A.52)
holds for all (s, x) ∈ [t, TN−1]× [ct,+∞), where β0(s, 1/2), β1(s, 1/2) are as defined in
(A.14) with a0(s) = −ξ, a1(s) = 1, s ∈ [TN−1, T ) and a0(s) = a˜0(s), a1(s) = a˜1(s), s ∈
[TN−2, TN−1). Moreover,
1
2
∫ TN−1
t
a˜1(s)
(
1− a˜1(s)
)‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds = 0. (A.53)
Proposition 11 Suppose α = 1/2. Then, pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for
multiple-time-point α-level quantile maximization if and only if pˆi is given by (3.3) for some
constant ξ < x0.
A.2.1 Detailed Proofs
Proof of Lemma 8 If t ≥ T1, then X0,x0(T1) = x0 and thus Xx0,pˆiT1 = {x0}. For any t ∈ [T1, T ],
we have X pˆiT1,x0(t) = X
pˆi
0,x0
(t) and thus Xx0,T1,pˆit = X
x0,pˆi
t . In the following, we consider the
case in which t < T1.
Fix x1 ∈ Xx0,pˆiT1 and t ∈ [T1, T ]. If θ0(s) + θ1(s)x1 = 0 for any s ∈ [T1, t), then Proposition
12-(i) and (ii) show that Xx1,T1,pˆit = {x1} ⊆ Xx0,pˆiT1 ⊆ Xx0,pˆit . If θ0(s) + θ1(s)x1 6= 0 for
some s ∈ [T1, t), then Proposition 12-(iii) and (iv) show that X pˆi0,x0(t) and X pˆiT1,x1(t) have
density functions, so Xx0,pˆit and X
x1,T1,pˆi
t are the interiors of the support of X
pˆi
0,x0
(t) and
X pˆiT1,x1(t), respectively. It is well known that the support of X
pˆi
T1,x
(t) is contained in the
support of X pˆi0,x0(t) for each x in the support of X
pˆi
0,x0
(T1). As a result, X
x1,T1,pˆi
t ⊆ Xx1,pˆit for
any x1 ∈ Xx0,pˆiT1 . 
Proof of Proposition 10 For α ∈ (0, 1/2), similar to Proposition 7, it’s straightforward to
show that pˆi as given by (3.4) is an intra-personal equilibrium for multiple-time-point α-level
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quantile maximization.
Suppose that pˆi ∈ A is an intra-personal equilibrium for the multiple-time-point α-
level quantile maximization. For α ∈ (1/2, 1), fix any x1 ∈ Xx0,pˆiTN−1 . According to Lemma
8, pˆi(t, x), t ∈ [TN−1, T ), x ∈ R is an intra-personal equilibrium for the α-level quantile
maximization with time interval [TN−1, T ] and initial wealth x1 at time TN−1. According to
Theorem 1, however, pˆi cannot be an intrapersonal equilibrium so we derive a contradiction.
Thus, there does not exist intra-personal equilibrium in A for the multiple-time-point α-level
quantile maximization with α ∈ (1/2, 1).
For α ∈ (0, 1/2), recall t∗ as defined in Lemma 2, t as defined in Lemma 4. We claim that
it is either the case t∗ = 0 or the case t = T and, consequently, (3.4) holds. For the sake of
contradiction, suppose t∗ > 0 and t < T . Then, the definition of t∗ and t implies that t < t∗.
Moreover, there exist two target dates Ti−1 < Ti, such that t∗ ∈ (Ti−1, Ti], i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Fix any T ′i−1 ∈ (max{Ti−1, t}, t∗). For any t ∈ [T ′i−1, t∗), ǫ ∈ (0, t∗− t), s ∈ [t∗, T ], and x ∈ R,
we have X pˆit,x(s) = X
pˆi
t,x(t
∗), X pˆit,ǫ,πt,x (s) = X
pˆit,ǫ,π
t,x (t
∗). For any x′ ∈ Xx0,pˆiT ′i−1 , by Lemma 8, pˆi is
an intra-personal equilibrium for the α-level quantile maximization for the period [T ′i−1, t
∗]
and with initial wealth x′ at time T ′i−1. Then, by Theorem 1, pˆi(t, x) = θ(t)(x − x′), ∀t ∈
[T ′i , t
∗), x ∈ R for some θ ∈ Cpw([T ′i−1, t∗)). Because t < T ′i−1, Proposition 12-(iii) and (iv)
imply that Xx0,pˆiT ′i−1
is a nonempty open interval. Then, taking arbitrary x′ 6= x′′ in Xx0,pˆiT ′i−1 , we
have pˆi(t, x) = θ(t)(x − x′) and pˆi(t, x) = θ(t)(x − x′′) for all t ∈ [T ′i−1, t∗) and x ∈ R, so
θ(t) = 0 for any t ∈ [T ′i−1, t∗). This, however, contradicts, the definition of t∗. 
Proof of Lemma 9 Fix any xN−1 ∈ Xx0,pˆiTN−1 . According to Lemma 8, pˆi is an intra-personal
equilibrium for the α-level quantile maximization in the period [TN−1, T ] and with initial
wealth xN−1 at time TN−1. Theorem 1 then yields that (A.44) holds for some constant
ξ < xN−1. Because xN−1 ∈ Xx0,pˆiTN−1 is arbitrary, we derive (A.45) holds and, consequently, the
left end of Xx0,pˆiTN−1 is finite.
Next, it is straightforward to see from (A.44) that t∗ = T and t∗ ≤ TN−1. For the
sake of contradiction, suppose τ ∗ < TN−1. Then, similar to the proof in Lemma 4, for any
t ∈ [τ ∗ ∨ TN−2, TN−1), x ∈ Xx0,pˆit , and π ∈ Rm with b(t)⊤π > 0 and Qπ ≥ 0, there exists
ǫ0 > 0 such that G
pit,ǫ,π(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1) > x = Gpˆi(t, x, 12 ;TN−1) for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0]. Recall t as
defined in Lemma 4. If t ≥ τ ∗, then t ≥ TN−1 and, consequently, Xx0,pˆiTN−1 = {x0}. Then, (A.45)
implies that ξ < x0. As a result, for any t ∈ [τ ∗∨TN−2, TN−1), Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit = {x0} is nonempty.
If t < τ ∗, then for any t ∈ [τ ∗ ∨ TN−2, TN−1), Proposition 12-(iii) and (iv) show that Xx0,pˆit is
a nonempty open interval and thus Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit is nonempty. Therefore, whether or not t ≥ τ ∗,
for any t ∈ [τ ∗∨TN−2, TN−1), we can always find some x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \Spˆit , and Proposition 13-(iv)
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and Proposition 14-(ii) show that F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α)) < 0. By the definition of τ ∗, we have
pˆi(t, x) = 0, so we conclude from (A.4) that there exists π ∈ Rm with b(t)⊤π > 0 and Qπ ≥ 0
and ǫ1 ∈ (0, ǫ0] such that Gpit,ǫ,π(t, x, 12) > Gpˆi(t, x, 12), ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ1]. Recall that we already
showed that for such π, Gpit,ǫ,π(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1) > x = Gpˆi(t, x, 12 ;TN−1) for sufficiently small ǫ.
As a result, pˆi is not an intra-personal equilibrium, which is a contradiction. Thus, we must
have τ ∗ = TN−1. 
Proof of Lemma 10 For each α ∈ (0, 1), denote by
ϕ˜pˆit,x,α(v) : = F
pˆi
x (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α;TN−1);TN−1)b(t)⊤v
+
1
2
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α;TN−1);TN−1)‖σ(t)⊤v‖2. (A.54)
For any t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1) and x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \S˜pˆit , Lemma 2 with [t, T ] therein replaced by [t, TN−1]
yield that
lim
ǫ↓0
Gpit,ǫ,π(t, x, α;TN−1)−Gpˆi(t, x, α;TN−1)
ǫ
=
ϕ˜pˆit,x,α(pˆi(t, x))− ϕ˜pˆit,x,α(π)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α;TN−1);TN−1)
.
Combining the above with Lemma 2, we have
lim
ǫ↓0
J(t, x;pit,ǫ,π)− J(t, x; pˆi)
ǫ
= (1− wN−1,N)
ϕ˜pˆit,x,α(pˆi(t, x))− ϕ˜pˆit,x,α(π)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α;TN−1);TN−1)
+ wN−1,N
ϕpˆit,x,α(pˆi(t, x))− ϕpˆit,x,α(π)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, α))
.
Now, we set α = 1
2
. Then, we have
lim
ǫ↓0
J(t, x;pit,ǫ,π)− J(t, x; pˆi)
ǫ
= ϕˆpˆit,x(pˆi(t, x))− ϕˆpˆit,x(π),
where
ϕˆpˆit,x(v) := λ
pˆi
1 (t, x)b(t)
⊤v +
1
2
λpˆi2 (t, x)‖σ(t)⊤v‖2.
As a result, because pˆi is an intra-personal equilibrium, we have
ϕˆpˆit,x(pˆi(t, x)) ≤ ϕˆpˆit,x(π), ∀π 6= pˆi(t, x) with Qπ ≥ 0. (A.55)
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Similar to the proof of Lemma 3, one can show that λpˆi1 (t, x) < 0 and λ
pˆi
2 (t, x) > 0. Then,
(A.55) immediately implies that −pˆi(t, x)λpˆi2 (t, x)/λpˆi1 (t, x) is the optimizer of (3.1), i.e.,
(A.46) holds.
Next, we prove t ≤ TN−2. For the sake of contradiction, suppose t > TN−2. By the
definition of t, X pˆi0,x0(s) = x0 and thus X
x0,pˆi
s = {x0} for all s ∈ [0, t]. When τ∗ > TN−2,
we choose any t ∈ [TN−2, τ∗ ∧ t ∧ TN−1) and when τ∗ ≤ TN−2 and ξ1 6= x0, we choose any
t ∈ [TN−2, t ∧ TN−1). For the above selected t, because x0 6= ξ1 and Xx0,pˆit = {x0}, we have
x0 ∈ Xx0,pˆit \S˜pˆit . As a result, λpˆi1 (t, x0) < 0, λpˆi2 (t, x0) > 0, and pˆi(t, x0) = −λ
pˆi
1 (t,x0)
λpˆi2 (t,x0)
v∗(t). The
above is a contradiction because t < t and thus pˆi(t, x0) = 0 and because v
∗(t) 6= 0.
The remaining case is when τ∗ ≤ TN−2 and ξ1 = x0. In this case, we have t ≥ TN−1,
so X pˆi0,x0(s) = x0 and X
x0,pˆi
s = {x0} for all s ∈ [0, t]. Fix t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1). For any
π ∈ Rm with b(t)⊤π > 0 and Qπ ≥ 0, there exists ǫ0 ∈ (0, TN−1 − t), such that for
any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0], Fpit,ǫ,π(t, x0, x0;TN−1) = Φ
(
− ∫ t+ǫ
t
b(s)⊤πds√∫ t+ǫ
t ‖σ(s)⊤π‖2ds
)
< 1
2
. In addition, because
π 6= 0, Fpit,ǫ,π(t, x0, y;TN−1) is strictly increasing and continuous in y for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0].
Consequently, we conclude that Gpit,ǫ,π(t, x0,
1
2
;TN−1) > x0 = Gpˆi(t, x0, 12 ;TN−1) for any ǫ ∈
(0, ǫ0], where the equality is the case because X
pˆi
0,x0
(TN−1) = x0. In other words, the median
of wealth at time TN−1 is improved by taking any strategy π with b(t)⊤π > 0 and Qπ ≥ 0.
To complete the proof, we only need to show that there exists π with b(t)⊤π > 0 and Qπ ≥ 0
such that taking π also improves the median of wealth at time T because this implies that
pˆi is not an intra-personal equilibrium and thus we have a contradiction.
If ξ1 = ξ, then we must have t = T because t > TN−1, ξ1 = x0, and (A.44) holds. In
this case, for any π ∈ Rm with b(t)⊤π > 0 and Qπ ≥ 0, there exists ǫ1 ∈ (0, ǫ0] such that
Fpit,ǫ,π(t, x0, x0) = Φ
(
− ∫ t+ǫt b(s)⊤πds√∫ t+ǫ
t
‖σ(s)⊤π‖2ds
)
< 1
2
for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ1]. In addition, because π 6= 0,
Fpit,ǫ,π(t, x0, y) is strictly increasing and continuous in y for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0]. As a result,
Gpit,ǫ,π(t, x0,
1
2
) > x0 = G
pˆi(t, x0,
1
2
), ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ1], where the equality is the case because t = T
and thus X pˆi0,x0(T ) = x0.
If ξ1 6= ξ, then we must have t∗ = TN−1. As a result, Proposition 13-(iv) and Proposi-
tion 14-(ii) imply that F pˆix (t, x0, G
pˆi(t, x0, α)) < 0. Because pˆi(t, x0) = 0, we conclude from
(A.4) that there exists ǫ1 ∈ (0, ǫ0] and π ∈ Rm with b(t)⊤π > 0 and Qπ ≥ 0 such that
Gpit,ǫ,π(t, x, 1
2
) > Gpˆi(t, x, 1
2
), ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ1]. 
Proof of Lemma 11 Proposition 12-(i) shows that Xx0,pˆit is increasing in t ∈ [0, T ]. Combining
the above with (A.45), we immediately derive part (i) of the Lemma.
Next, we prove part (ii). Recall that Lemma 9 shows τ ∗ = TN−1 and t∗ = T and that
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Lemma 10 shows t ≤ TN−2. Then, following the same proof as the one of Lemma 5, we
can derive (A.47) and (A.48) from (A.46). Because τ ∗ = TN−1 and t∗ = T and because
S
pˆi
t ⊆ S˜pˆit , ∀t ∈ [0, TN−1), we derive from Propositions 13 and 14 that for t ∈ (0, TN−1) and
x ∈ Xx0,pˆit \S˜
pˆi
t ,
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2)) + F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2))b(t)⊤pˆi(t, x)
+
1
2
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2))‖σ(t)pˆi(t, x)‖2 = 0,
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1);TN−1) + F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1);TN−1)b(t)⊤pˆi(t, x)
+
1
2
F pˆixx(t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1);TN−1)‖σ(t)pˆi(t, x)‖2 = 0.
Multiplying by wN−1,N/F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
)) and (1−wN−1,N)/F pˆiy (t, x, Gpˆi(t, x, 12 ;TN−1);TN−1)
to both sides of the first and second equations, respectively, in the above and summing them
up, we obtain
wN−1,N
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
))
+ (1− wN−1,N)
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1);TN−1)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1);TN−1)
+λpˆi1 (t, x)b(t)
⊤
pˆi(t, x) +
1
2
λpˆi2 (t, x)‖σ(t)pˆi(t, x)‖2 = 0.
Combining the above with (A.47) and (A.48), we obtain
wN−1,N
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
))
+ (1− wN−1,N)
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1);TN−1)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1
2
;TN−1);TN−1)
+
1
2
λpˆi1 (t, x)ρ(t)
(
a˜0(t) + a˜1(t)x
)
= 0. (A.56)
Proposition 14-(ii) and (iii) yield that
Gpˆix (t, x, 1/2) = −
F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2))
, Gpˆit (t, x, 1/2) = −
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2))
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2))
,
Gpˆix (t, x, 1/2;TN−1) = −
F pˆix (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1);TN−1)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1);TN−1)
,
Gpˆit (t, x, 1/2;TN−1) = −
F pˆit (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1);TN−1)
F pˆiy (t, x, G
pˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1);TN−1)
.
Plugging above into (A.56), we derive the differential equation in (A.49). Because τ ∗ = TN−1,
Proposition 14-(iv) yields that limt↑TN−1,x′→xG
pˆi(t, x′, 1/2;TN−1) = x, ∀x ∈ R. Because t∗ =
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T , Proposition 14-(iv) yields that
lim
t↑TN−1,x′→x
Gpˆi(t, x′, 1/2) = Gpˆi(TN−1, x, 1/2) = (x− ξ)e
∫ T
TN−1
(ρ(s)/2)ds
+ ξ, ∀x 6= ξ,
where the where the second equality is the case due to (A.44). As a result, we derive the
boundary condition in (A.49). 
Proof of Lemma 12 We prove part (i) first. For the sake of contradiction, suppose a˜1(s) =
0, s ∈ [t, TN−1). Because τ ∗ = TN−1 by Lemma 9, for any s ∈ [t, TN−1), there exists
τ ∈ [s, TN−1) with θ0(τ) 6= 0 and thus a˜0(τ) 6= 0. As a result, for any x ∈ Xx0,pˆit ,
X pˆit,x(TN−1) = x+
∫ TN−1
t
a˜0(τ)v
∗(τ)⊤b(τ)dτ +
∫ TN−1
t
a˜0(τ)v
∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ)
is a non-degenerate normal random variable, which, together with Lemma 8, implies that
X
x0,pˆi
TN−1
⊇ Xx,t,pˆiTN−1 = R. On the other hand, (A.45) implies that the left end of Xx0,pˆiTN−1 is finite,
so we arrive at contradiction.
Next, we prove part (ii). Because Xx0,pˆit = (x(t),+∞) by Lemma 11 and because Xx0,pˆis
is increasing in s, there exists xt such that [xt,+∞) ⊂ Xx0,pˆis \{ξ, ξ1}, ∀s ∈ [t, TN−1]. As a
result, (A.49) holds in the region [t, TN−1]× (xt,+∞). Similar to the proof of Lemma 7, we
can apply Lemma 6 to conclude that there exists ct > max(x(t), ξ, ξ1) such that
gpˆi(s, x) = wN−1,N
(
β1(s, 1/2)x+ β0(s, 1/2)
)
+ (1− wN−1,N)
(
β˜1(s)x+ β˜0(s)
)
for all (s, x) ∈ [t, TN−1]× [ct,+∞). Consequently, (A.52) holds.
Finally, the proof of (A.53) is the same as the proof of (A.17) in Lemma 7. 
Proof of Proposition 11 By Lemma 12-(ii), we have
1
2
∫ TN−1
t
a˜1(s)
(
1− a˜1(s)
)‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds = 0, ∀t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1),
which implies that a˜1(t)(1 − a˜1(t)) = 0, t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1). Lemma 12-(i) shows for any
t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1), a˜1(s) 6= 0 for some s ∈ [t, TN−1). Then, we must have a˜1(t) = 1, t ∈
(TN−2, TN−1) because a˜1 ∈ C([TN−2, TN−1)) as shown by Lemma 11-(ii). Then, (A.48) implies
that
pˆi(t, x) = (a˜0(t) + x)v
∗(t), t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1), x ∈ R. (A.57)
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Define aˆ0 by setting aˆ0(t) = a˜0(t), t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1) and aˆ0(t) = −ξ, t ∈ [TN−1, T ). Then, we
have
pˆi(t, x) = (aˆ0(t) + x)v
∗(t), t ∈ [TN−2, T ), x ∈ R.
Next, we prove that aˆ0(t) = −ξ for any t ∈ [TN−2, T ).
Lemma 11-(i) shows that Xx0,pˆit = (x(t),+∞), t ∈ (TN−2, TN−1] for some decreasing func-
tion x on (TN−2, TN−1]. Moreover, we derive from (A.45) that x(T ) ≥ ξ. Because the
closure of Xx0,pˆiTN−1 , which is equal to [x(T ),+∞), is the support of X pˆi0,x0(TN−1), we have
P(X pˆi0,x0(TN−1) ≥ ξ) ≥ P(X pˆi0,x0(TN−1) ≥ x(T )) = 1. Because pˆi(s, x) = (−ξ + x)v∗(s), s ∈
[TN−1, T ) and because x(T ) ≥ ξ, we conclude that for any t ∈ (TN−1, T ], P(X pˆi0,x0(t) ≥ ξ) = 1
and thus, by Proposition 12, Xx0,pˆit = (x(t),+∞) for some x(t) ∈ R.
Fix any t1 ∈ (TN−2, T ) and x1 ∈ Xx0,pˆit1 \{−aˆ0(t1)}. Lemma 8 implies that Xx1,t1,pˆit ⊆
X
x0,pˆi
t = (x(t),+∞), ∀t ∈ [t1, T ]. Proposition 12-(iv) then shows that aˆ0 must be increasing
on (t1, T ) and X
x1,t1,pˆi
t = (−aˆ0(t),+∞), ∀t ∈ (t1, T ); otherwise the lower end of Xx1,t1,pˆit
would be −∞. For each t ∈ (t1, T ), because Xx1,t1,pˆit ⊆ Xx0,pˆit = (x(t),+∞), we derive
−aˆ0(t) ≥ x(t). Moreover, Proposition 12-(i) shows that Xx1,t1,pˆis is increasing in s ≥ t1, so we
have {x1} = Xx1,t1,pˆit1 ⊆ Xx1,t1,pˆis = (−aˆ0(s),+∞), ∀s ∈ (t1, TN−1). Sending s in the above to
t1 and recalling that aˆ0 is right-continuous on [TN−2, T ), we conclude x1 ≥ −aˆ0(t1). Because
x1 ∈ Xx0,pˆit1 \{−aˆ0(t1)} = (x(t1),+∞)\{−aˆ0(t1)} is arbitrary, we derive that x(t1) ≥ −aˆ0(t1).
Because t1 is arbitrary, we conclude that aˆ0 is increasing on (TN−2, T ) and that x(t) = −aˆ0(t)
and thus Xx0,pˆit = (−aˆ0(t),+∞) for all t ∈ (TN−2, T ).
By the definition of τ∗ and ξ1, we have τ∗ = inf{t ∈ [0, TN−1] : aˆ0(s) = −ξ1, s ∈ [t, TN−1]}.
For t ∈ (TN−2, τ∗), S˜pˆit = ∅ and thus Xx0,pˆit \S˜pˆit = (−aˆ0(t),+∞), and for t ∈ [τ∗, TN−1),
S˜pˆit = {ξ1} = {−aˆ0(t)} and thus Xx0,pˆit \S˜pˆit = (−aˆ0(t),+∞). Also recall that aˆ is increasing
on (TN−2, T ) and is equal to ξ on [TN−1, T ), so −aˆ0(t) ≥ ξ for all t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1). As a
result, Lemma 11-(ii) and Lemma 6-(iii) yield that (A.52) holds for any x > −aˆ0(s) and
s ∈ (TN−2, TN−1).
Recall that t∗ ≤ TN−1 and in the following, we prove that t∗ ≤ TN−2. For the sake
of contradiction, suppose that t∗ ∈ (TN−2, TN−1]. Fix any t ∈ (TN−2, t∗). Because aˆ0 is
increasing in (TN−2, T ) and continuous on [TN−2, TN−1) and on [TN−1, T ), following the same
calculation of (A.33) in the proof of Proposition 9, we derive
X pˆit,−aˆ0(t)(T ) = −aˆ0(T ) +
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
s (b(τ)⊤v∗(τ)− 12‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ)dτ+
∫ T
s
v∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ)daˆ0(s).
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Similar to the derivation of (A.34), we derive that
X pˆit,−aˆ0(t)(T )− (β0(t, 1/2)− aˆ0(t)β1(t, 1/2))
=
∫ T
t
e
1
2
∫ T
s
ρ(τ)dτ+
∫ T
s
v∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ)daˆ0(s)−
∫ T
t
e
1
2
∫ T
s
ρ(τ)dτdaˆ0(s). (A.58)
Because t < t∗, daˆ0(s) defines a positive measure on (t, T ). Similar to the proof in Proposition
9, we can prove that there exists δt > 0 such that
Gpˆi(t, x, 1/2)− (β0(t, 1/2) + xβ1(t, 1/2)) > 0, ∀x ∈ (−aˆ0(t)− δt,−aˆ0(t) + δt). (A.59)
We first consider the case in which τ∗ ≤ TN−2. Then, because τ ∗ = TN−1 as shown in
Lemma 9, we conclude aˆ0(t) = −ξ1, ∀t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1). Because t∗ > TN−2 and ξ1 ≥ ξ, we
must have ξ1 > ξ and t
∗ = TN−1. Then, straightforward calculation yields
Gpˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1) = ξ1 + (x− ξ1)e 12
∫ TN−1
t ρ(s)ds = β˜1(t)x+ β˜0(t), x > ξ1, t ∈ [TN−2, TN−1).
Combining the above with (A.59), recalling that (A.52) holds for any x > −aˆ0(s) and
s ∈ (TN−2, TN−1), and noting that wN−1,N ∈ (0, 1], we derive a contradiction, so we must
have t∗ ≤ TN−2.
Next, we consider the case in which τ∗ > TN−2. Fix any t ∈ (TN−2, τ∗). Then, aˆ0(s) is not
constant in s ∈ [t, τ∗], which means that daˆ0(s) defines a positive measure on [t, τ∗]. Similar
to the derivation of (A.40), we can prove that there exists δ˜t > 0, such that
Gpˆi(t, x, 1/2;TN−1)−
(
β˜0(t) + xβ˜1(t)
)
> 0, ∀x ∈ (−aˆ0(t)− δ˜t,−aˆ0(t) + δ˜t).
Combining the above with (A.59), recalling that (A.52) holds for any x > −aˆ0(s) and
s ∈ (TN−2, TN−1), and noting that wN−1,N ∈ (0, 1], we derive a contradiction, so we must
have t∗ ≤ TN−2.
Having proved that t∗ ≤ TN−2 and thus aˆ0(s) = −ξ, ∀s ∈ [TN−2, T ), we conclude that
pˆi(t, x) = v∗(t)(x− ξ), t ∈ [TN−2, T ), x ∈ R. Applying Lemmas 9–12 and the above proof to
the periods [Ti−1, Ti), i = N − 2, N − 1, . . . , 1 sequentially, we can conclude that pˆi(t, x) =
(x− ξ)v∗(t), t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R for some ξ < x0. The proof then completes. 
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A.3 Other Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 By Assumption 1, there exists 0 =: t0 < t1 < · · · < tN := T such that σ
and b are continuous on [ti−1, ti) and can be continuously extended to [ti−1, ti], i = 1, . . . , N .
Thus, in the following, we only need to fix i and consider the continuous extension of b and
σ on [ti−1, ti].
Fix any t ∈ [ti−1, ti]. It is obvious that the optimal solution of (3.1) uniquely ex-
ists. Moreover, by Assumption 2, there exists v0 ∈ Rm with Qv ≥ 0 and b(t)⊤v0 > 0.
For sufficiently small ǫ > 0, vǫ := ǫv0 satisfies Qvǫ ≥ 0 and 12v⊤ǫ σ(t)σ(t)⊤vǫ − b(t)⊤vǫ =
ǫ
(
1
2
v⊤0 σ(t)σ(t)
⊤v0ǫ− b(t)⊤v0
)
< 0, so the optimal solution of (3.1), namely v∗(t), cannot be
0.
The Lagrange dual theory implies the follow equations:


σ(t)σ(t)⊤v∗(t)− b(t)−Q⊤λ = 0,
λ⊤Qv∗(t) = 0,
λ ≥ 0, Qv∗(t) ≥ 0.
(A.60)
Multiplying by v∗(t)⊤ from left on both sides of the first equation of (A.60) and recalling
the second equation of (A.60), we immediately conclude that b(t)⊤v∗(t) = ‖σ(t)⊤v∗(t)‖2.
Moreover, because v∗(t) 6= 0 and σ(t)σ(t)⊤ is positive definite, we have ‖σ(t)⊤v∗(t)‖2 > 0.
Finally, by Assumption 1 and Theorem 4.4 in Daniel (1973), we immediately conclude
that v∗ ∈ C([ti−1, ti]). As a result, inft∈[ti−1,ti] ‖v∗(t)‖ > 0 and inft∈[ti−1,ti] ‖σ(t)⊤v∗(t)‖2 > 0.

Proof of Proposition 1 Fix any t ∈ (0, T ). Because Xx0,pˆis = (ξ,+∞) for s ∈ (0, T ), because
p˜i agrees with pˆi for x ∈ Xx0,pˆis , s ∈ [0, T ), and because p˜i(s, x) is continuous in x, we have
X p˜it,ξ(s) = ξ, s ∈ [t, T ]. As a result, Gp˜i(t, ξ, 1/2) = ξ. Recall that v∗(t)⊤b(t) > 0, so there
exists ǫ0 ∈ (T − t) such that v∗(t)⊤b(s) > 0, s ∈ [t, t+ ǫ0]. Then, for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), we have
P
(
X
p˜it,ǫ,v∗(t)
t,ξ (T ) > ξ
)
≥ P
(
X
v∗(t)
t,ξ (t+ ǫ) > ξ
)
> 1/2,
where the first inequality is the case because on
{
X
v∗(t)
t,ξ (t+ ǫ) > ξ
}
, we have X
p˜it,ǫ,v∗(t)
t,ξ (T ) =
X pˆi
t+ǫ,X
v∗(t)
t,ξ (t+ǫ)
(T ) > ξ and the second inequality is the case because
∫ t+ǫ
t
v∗(t)⊤b(s)ds > 0. As
a result, Gp˜it,ǫ,v∗(t)(t, ξ, 1/2) > ξ due to the definition of right-continuous quantile functions.

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Proof of Proposition 2 Straightforward calculation leads to (4.3). For any s ∈ [0, T ),
by Assumption 2, we have ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖ = b(s)⊤v∗(s) > 0. Because γ ∈ (0, 1), we have
γ − 1
2
γ2 ∈ (0, 1). As a result, we conclude that at,γ is well defined and strictly larger than 1.
Finally, the comparison of Gpˆiξ(t, x, 1/2) and Gpiγ−Kelly(t, x, 1/2) is straightforward. 
Proof of Proposition 4 Given a portfolio insurance level ξ, we consider more generally
the pre-committed strategy planned by the agent at time t with wealth level xt; i.e., the
portfolio strategy that maximizes the median, conditional at time t with wealth level xt, of
the terminal wealth at time T . Recall that the risk-free rate r is set to be zero for simplicity
in our discussion.
According to Section 4 of He and Zhou (2011), the problem of finding the pre-committed
strategy is equivalent to the following:
Max
X
GX(1/2)
Subject to Et
[(
ρˆ(T )/ρˆ(t)
)
X
] ≤ xt, X ≥ ξ, (A.61)
where X stands for a possible wealth profile attained at time T , GX(1/2) stands for the
median of X , Et stands for the expectation conditional on the information at time t, and
ρˆ(s) : = e−
∫ s
0
1
2
‖θˆ(τ)‖2dτ−∫ s0 θˆ(τ)⊤dW (τ), s ∈ [t, T ],
θˆ(s) : = argmin
θ∈Rd
{‖θ‖2 : σ(s)θ − b(s) ∈ K∗}, s ∈ [t, T ),
where K := {π ∈ Rm : Qπ ≥ 0} and K∗ is the dual cone of K, i.e., K∗ := {y ∈ Rm :
y⊤π ≥ 0, ∀π ∈ K}. It is known that ρˆ(t)/ρˆ(s), s ∈ [t, T ] is the wealth process of the optimal
portfolio under expected logarithmic utility maximization with initial wealth at time t to be
1, and this optimal portfolio is indeed the Kelly portfolio (3.2); see for instance Karatzas and
Shreve (1998). Therefore, we immediately conclude that θˆ(s) = σ(s)⊤v∗(s) and consequently
ρˆ(s) : = e−
∫ s
0
1
2
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ−∫ s0 v∗(τ)⊤σ(τ)dW (τ), s ∈ [t, T ]. (A.62)
By changing of variable, X˜ = X − ξ, problem (A.61) is equivalent to (C.1) with ρ =
ρˆ(T )/ρˆ(t), m to be a Dirac measure at 1/2, and x˜ = xt − ξ. Then, Corollary 1 yields
that the optimal solution to (A.61) is X∗ = ξ + k∗t 1ρˆ(T )/ρˆ(t)≤β∗t , where β
∗
t := F
−1
ρˆ(T )/ρˆ(t)(1/2)
and k∗t :=
xt−ξ
E[ρˆ(T )/ρˆ(t)1ρˆ(T )/ρˆ(t)≤β∗t
]
. Denoting Z(t) :=
∫ t
0
v∗(s)⊤σ(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ], we have
log(ρˆ(t)) = −Z(t) − 1
2
∫ t
0
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds. As a result, we can rewrite the optimal solution
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to (A.61) as follows:
X∗ = ξ +
xt − ξ
E
[
e−(Z(T )−Z(t))−
1
2
∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds1Z(T )−Z(t)≥0
]1Z(T )−Z(t)≥0
= ξ +
xt − ξ
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
)1Z(T )−Z(t)≥0.
Denote by pit,pc the pre-committed strategy, i.e., the strategy that attains terminal wealth
is equal to X∗. Then, for any s ∈ [t, T ], we have
X
pit,pc
t,xt (s) = Es
[(
ρˆ(T )/ρˆ(s)
)
X∗
]
= ξ +
xt − ξ
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
)Es [e−(Z(T )−Z(s))− 12 ∫ Ts ‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ1Z(T )−Z(t)≥0]
= ξ +
xt − ξ
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
)Φ (d(s, Z(s)− Z(t))) (A.63)
where
d(s, z) :=
z − ∫ T
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ√∫ T
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
.
By Itoˆ’s lemma and straightforward calculation, we obtain
pit,pc
(
s,X
pit,pc
t,xt (s)
)
X
pit,pc
t,xt (s)− ξ
=
1√∫ T
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
Φ′ (d(s, Z(s)− Z(t)))
Φ (d(s, Z(s)− Z(t))) v
∗(s), s ∈ [t, T ).
(A.64)
For each s ∈ (t, T ], d(s, z) is continuous, strictly increasing in z and
lim
z↓−∞
d(s, z) = −∞, lim
z↑+∞
d(s, z) = +∞.
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As a result, X
pit,pc
t,xt (s) is continuous, strictly increasing in Z(s)− Z(t), and
lim
Z(s)−Z(t)↓−∞
X
pit,pc
t,xt (s) = ξ, lim
Z(s)−Z(t)↑+∞
X
pit,pc
t,xt (s) = ξ +
xt − ξ
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
t
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
) .
Denote the inverse function of the relation betweenX
pit,pc
t,xt (s) and Z(s)−Z(t) as zt(s,Xpit,pct,xt (s)).
Then, we have
pit,pc (s, x)
x− ξ =
1√∫ T
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
Φ′ (d(s, zt(s, x)))
Φ (d(s, zt(s, x)))
v∗(s), s ∈ [t, T ), x ∈ (ξ, ξ + k∗t ).
Moreover,
(
Φ′(d)/Φ(d)
)′
= [−dΦ′(d)Φ(d) − Φ′(d)2]/Φ(d)2 < 0, where the inequality is the
case because −dΦ(d) < Φ′(d) for any d ∈ R. As a result,
∆t,pc(s, x) :=
1√∫ T
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
Φ′ (d(s, zt(s, x)))
Φ (d(s, zt(s, x)))
is strictly decreasing in x,
lim
x↓ξ
∆t,pc(s, x) = lim
d↓−∞
1√∫ T
s
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
Φ′ (d)
Φ (d)
= +∞,
and, similarly, limx↑ξ+k∗t ∆t,pc(s, x) = 0.
Specializing the above at t = 0, we complete the proof of part (i) of the Proposition. For
part (ii), Corollary 1 yields that the optimal median of the terminal wealth is k∗0, i.e.,
Gpi0,pc(0, x0, 1/2) = ξ + k
∗
0 = ξ +
x0 − ξ
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
0
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
) .
Consider the function f(x) := Φ(−x)− e−x2/2, x ≥ 0. We have f ′(x) = e−x2/2(x− (2π)−1/2),
so f is strictly decreasing on [0, (2π)−1/2] and strictly increasing on [(2π)−1/2,+∞). Because
f(0) = −1/2 < 0 and limx↑+∞ f(x) = 0, we conclude that Φ(−x) < e−x2/2 for any x ≥ 0. As
a result, Gpi0,pc(0, x0, 1/2) > G
pˆiξ(0, x0, 1/2).
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For any t ∈ (0, T ) and x ∈ (ξ, ξ + k∗0), we have
Pt(X
pi0,pc
0,x0 (T ) = ξ) = 1− Pt(Xpi0,pc0,x0 (T ) = ξ + k∗0) = Pt(Z(T ) < 0)
= Pt(Z(T )− Z(t) < −Z(t))

> 1/2, Z(t) < 0,≤ 1/2, Z(t) ≥ 0.
Also note that Z(t) ≥ 0 if and only if
X
pi0,pc
0,x0 (t) ≥ ξ +
x0 − ξ
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
0
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
)Φ (d(t, 0)) = x0.
Therefore,
Gpi0,pc(t, x, 1/2) =

ξ + k
∗
0, x ∈ [x0, ξ + k∗0),
ξ, x ∈ (ξ, x0).
Then, Proposition 2 yields (4.6) immediately. Recall that Φ(−x) < e−x2/2 for any x ≥ 0, so
1 <
e−
1
2
∫ T
0
‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
0
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
) ≤ a˜t < 1
Φ
(
−
√∫ T
0
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
) = k∗0
x0 − ξ .
The proof then completes. 
Proof of Proposition 5 By definition,
pina(t, x) = pit,pc(t, X
pit,pc
t,x (t)) =
1√∫ T
t
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ
Φ′ (d(t, 0))
Φ (d(t, 0))
v∗(t)(x− ξ),
where the second equality is the case due to (A.64). Recall that d(t, 0) = −
√∫ T
t
‖σ(τ)⊤v∗(τ)‖2dτ ,
we immediately obtain (4.7).
Because Φ′(d) > dΦ(−d) for any d > 0, we conclude that ∆na(t) > 1, t ∈ [0, T ). Further-
more, it is easy to see that limt→T ∆na(t) = +∞.
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Finally, fix any t ∈ [0, T ) and x > ξ and consider τ ∈ (t, T ). Then, we have
Xpinat,x (τ) = ξ + (x− ξ)e
∫ τ
t ∆na(s)b(s)
⊤v∗(s)ds− 1
2
∫ τ
t ∆na(s)
2‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds+∫ τt ∆na(s)v∗(s)⊤σ(s)dW (s)
= ξ + (x− ξ)e
∫ τ
t (∆na(s)− 12∆na(s)2)‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds+
∫ τ
t
∆na(s)v∗(s)⊤σ(s)dW (s),
where the second equality is the case due to Lemma 1. As a result, the median of Xpinat,x (τ),
denoted as Gpina(t, x, 1/2; τ), is
Gpina(t, x, 1/2; τ) = ξ + (x− ξ)e
∫ τ
t (∆na(s)− 12∆na(s)2)‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖2ds.
Because infs∈[0,T ) ‖σ(s)⊤v∗(s)‖ > 0 as shown in Lemma 1, it is easy to see that
∫ T
t
∆na(s)ds < +∞,
∫ T
t
∆na(s)
2ds = +∞.
As a result, limτ↑T Gpina(t, x, 1/2; τ) = ξ. 
Proof of Proposition 6 It is a standard result in portfolio selection that pˆiξ maximizes
E[ln(Xpi(T )− ξ)]; see for instance Karatzas and Shreve (1998). 
B Distributional Properties of Linear SDEs
In the section, we provide some distributional properties of the wealth equation for a given
strategy in A. Assume the risk-free rate to be zero. Then, the wealth equation becomes
{
dX(t) = (θ0(t) + θ1(t)X(t))
⊤ b(t)dt + (θ0(t) + θ1(t)X(t))
⊤ σ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = x0 ∈ R,
(B.1)
where θ0, θ1, b, σ ∈ Cpw([0, T )) and σ(t)⊤σ(t) is positive definite for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Recall the
set of reachable states of X(t) as defined in Section 2.3 and denote it as Xt. The support of
X(t) is then the closure of Xt. The following proposition proves some properties of Xt.
Proposition 12 Denote
t = inf{s ∈ [0, T ] : θ0(s) + x0θ1(s) 6= 0},
t¯ = inf{s ∈ [0, T ] :
∫ s
0
‖θ0(z) + h˜(z)θ1(z)‖dz > 0},
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where
h˜(t) := −θ0(t)
⊤σ(t)σ(t)⊤θ1(t)
‖σ(t)⊤θ1(t)‖2 1θ1(t)6=0, t ∈ [0, T ],
x∗(t) :=
∫ t
0
b(s)⊤θ0(s)e
∫ t
s b(z)
⊤θ1(z)dzds+ x0e
∫ t
0 b(s)
⊤θ1(s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Then, the following are true:
(i) Xt is increasing in t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) For any t ∈ [0, t], X(t) = x∗(t) = x0 and Xt = {x0}.
(iii) For any t ∈ (t¯, T ], Xt = R and X(t) has a probability density that is positive on R.
(iv) Suppose t < t¯ and fix any t ∈ (t, t¯]. Xt is an open, unbounded interval and X(t) has
a probability density that is positive on Xt. Moreover, if θ1(s) 6= 0, ∀s ∈ (t, t), the
following are true:
(a) Suppose there exist s1, s2 ∈ (t, t), such that h˜(s1) < x∗(s1), h˜(s1) > x∗(s1). Then
Xt = R.
(b) Suppose h˜(s) ≤ x∗(s) for any s ∈ (t, t). If h˜ is not decreasing on (t, t), then
Xt = R. If h˜ is decreasing in on (t, t), then h˜(s) < x
∗(s) for any s ∈ (t, t) and
Xt = (h˜(t−),+∞), where h˜(t−) := lims↑t h˜(s).
(c) Suppose h˜(s) ≥ x∗(s) for any s ∈ (t, t). If h˜ is not increasing on (t, t), then
Xt = R. If h˜ is increasing on (t, t), then h˜(s) > x
∗(s) for any s ∈ (t, t) and
Xt = (−∞, h˜(t−)), where h˜(t−) := lims↑t h˜(s).
Proof See Corollary 4 and Theorem 3 in He and Jiang (2020). 
Next, we consider the transition probability of (X(t))t≥0. For each t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ R,
define
F (t, x, y) := P(X(T ) ≤ y|X(t) = x), y ∈ R,
G(t, x, α) := sup{y ∈ R : F (t, x, y) ≤ α}, α ∈ (0, 1)
to be respectively the transition cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the (right-
continuous) quantile function of the wealth equation (X(t))t≥0. For any function g(t, x, y)
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that is differentiable in t and twice differentiable in x, define
Ag(t, x, y) = gt(t, x, y) + (θ0(t) + θ1(t)x)⊤ b(t)gx(t, x, y)
+
1
2
‖σ(t)⊤(θ0(t) + θ1(t)x)‖2gxx(t, x, y),
where gt, gx, and gxx denote respectively the first-order derivative of g with respect to t,
first- and second-order derivatives of g with respect to x.
We introduce some notations. For any interval [c, d) and open set O in Rl, denote by
C
0,∞([a, b) × O) the set of functions g(t, z) from [a, b) × O to R such that its derivatives
with respect to z of any order exist and are continuous in (t, z) on [a, b) × O, denote by
C
1,∞([a, b) × O) the set of functions g(t, z) from [a, b) × O to R such that its first-order
derivative with respect to t and its derivatives with respect to z of any order exist and are
continuous in (t, z) on [a, b)×O. Denote by C1,∞pw ([a, b)×O) the set of functions g(t, z) from
[a, b)× O to Rl such that there exists a = t0 < t1 < . . . tN = b with g ∈ C1,∞([ti−1, ti)× O),
i = 1, . . . , N . Denote by N0 = N ∪ {0}, where N is the set of positive integers.
The following proposition provides a complete picture of the transition probability dis-
tribution F (t, x, y).
Proposition 13 Define
t∗ := inf{t ∈ [0, T ) : θ0(s) = θ1(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t, T )}
with the convention that inf ∅ = T and
t∗ := inf{t ∈ [0, t∗) : there exists ξ ∈ R such that θ0(s) + ξθ1(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t, t∗)}
with the convention that inf ∅ = t∗. Then, when t∗ < t∗, there exists unique ξ ∈ R such that
c˜∗2(s) + ξc3(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t∗, t∗). Consider any partitions 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tm = t∗ <
tm+1 < · · · < tn = t∗ such that θ0, θ1, b, and σ are continuous on [ti−1, ti) with the left limit
at ti existent. Then, the following hold:
(i) For each i = m + 1, . . . , n, F ∈ C1,∞([ti−1, t) × (R2\{(ξ, ξ)})), Ft ∈ C0,∞([ti−1, t) ×(
R2\{(ξ, ξ)})), and
AF (t, x, y) = 0, ∀(x, y) ∈ R2\ {(ξ, ξ)} , t ∈ [ti−1, ti). (B.2)
Moreover, for any τ ∈ [t∗, t∗), Ft(t, x, y) is bounded in (x, y) ∈ R2\{(ξ, ξ)}, t ∈ [t∗, τ ]
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and
sup
t∈[t∗,τ ],(x−ξ)2+(y−ξ)2≥δ2
∣∣∣∣ ∂ℓ+j+kF∂tℓ∂xj∂yj (t, x, y)
∣∣∣∣ < +∞. (B.3)
for any δ > 0, ℓ ∈ {0, 1} and j, k ∈ N0.
(ii) For each i = 1, . . . , m, F belongs to C1,∞
(
[ti−1, ti)× R2
)
and
AF (t, x, y) = 0, (t, x, y) ∈ [ti−1, ti)× R2. (B.4)
Moreover, for any τ ′ ∈ [0, t∗) and i, j ∈ N0, | ∂i+jF∂xi∂yj (t, x, y)| is bounded in (t, x, y) ∈
[0, τ ′]× R2, and supt∈[0,τ ′],y∈R | ∂i+jFt∂xi∂yj (t, x, y)| is of polynomial growth in x.
(iii) F is continuous on [0, t∗)×R2∪{(t, x, y) | (x, y) ∈ R2\{(ξ, ξ)}, t ∈ [t∗, t∗)} and for any
j, k ∈ N0, ∂j+kF∂xj∂yk (t, x, y) is continuous on [0, t∗)×R2 ∪ {t∗} ×R× (R\{ξ})∪ {(t, x, y) |
(x, y) ∈ R2\{(ξ, ξ)}, t ∈ (t∗, t∗)}. For any τ ∈ [t∗, t∗), δ > 0, and j, k ∈ N0,
sup
t∈[0,τ ],x∈R,|y−ξ|>δ
∣∣∣∣ ∂j+kF∂xj∂yk (t, x, y)
∣∣∣∣ < +∞, (B.5)
and supt∈[0,τ ],|y−ξ|>δ
∣∣∣∂j+kFt∂xj∂yk (t, x, y)∣∣∣ is of polynomial growth in x.
(iv) For any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, t∗) × R2 ∪ {(t, x, y) | (x, y) ∈ R2\{(ξ, ξ)}, t ∈ [t∗, t∗)} with
F (t, x, y) ∈ (0, 1), we have Fx(t, x, y) < 0.
(v) For any x 6= y,
lim
t↑t∗,(x′,y′)→(x,y)
F (t, x′, y′) = F (t∗, x, y) = 1x≤y. (B.6)
Proof See Corollary 3 and Theorem 2 in He and Jiang (2020). 
Finally, the following proposition shows some properties of the transition quantileG(t, x, α):
Proposition 14 Suppose the same conditions as assumed in Proposition 13 hold and denote
D := {(t, x) | t ∈ [0, t∗), x ∈ R} ∪ {(t, x) | x 6= ξ, t ∈ [t∗, t∗)}.
Then, the following are true:
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(i) For any (t, x) ∈ ([0, T ]× R)\D and α ∈ (0, 1), G(t, x, α) = x.
(ii) For any (t, x) ∈ D and α ∈ (0, 1), G(t, x, α) is uniquely determined by
F (t, x, G(t, x, α)) = α.
Moreover, G(t, x, α) is continuous in (t, x, α) on D × (0, 1) and satisfies
G(t, x, α) 6= ξ, ∀x 6= ξ, t ∈ [t∗, t∗), α ∈ (0, 1),
Fy(t, x, G(t, x, α)) > 0, ∀(t, x) ∈ D, α ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, G(t, x, α) is infinitely differentiable in (x, α) for any (t, x, α) ∈ D×(0, 1),
and its derivatives are continuous in (t, x, α) on D × (0, 1). In particular, we have
Gx(t, x, α) = −Fx(t, x, G(t, x, α))
Fy(t, x, G(t, x, α))
, (t, x) ∈ D, α ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) G ∈ C1,∞([ti−1, ti)× R × (0, 1)) for all i = 1, . . . , m and G ∈ C1,∞({(t, x) | x 6= ξ, t ∈
[ti−1, ti)} × (0, 1)
)
for all i = m+ 1, . . . , n. In particular,
Gt(t, x, α) = −Ft(t, x, G(t, x, α))
Fy(t, x, G(t, x, α))
, (t, x) ∈ D, α ∈ (0, 1).
(iv) For any x ∈ R and α ∈ (0, 1),
lim
t↑t∗ ,(x′,α′)→(x,α)
G(t, x′, α′) = G(t∗, x, α) = x.
Proof See Corollaries 3 and 2 in He and Jiang (2020). 
C A Static Portfolio Selection Problem
In this Section, we consider an optimization problem that is related to portfolio selection
under median maximization. This problem is a generalization of the portfolio selection under
Yaari (1987)’s dual theory of decision under risk studied by He and Zhou (2011).
62
C.1 Model and Solution
Consider the following problem
Max V (X˜) =
∫
[0,1]
GX˜(z)m(dz)
Subject to E[ρX˜ ] ≤ x˜, X˜ ≥ 0, (C.1)
where X˜ and ρ live on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) with ρ to be strictly positive and
integrable, x˜ > 0 is a constant, GX˜ stands for the quantile function of X˜ with GX˜(0) :=
essinf X˜ and GX˜(1) := esssup X˜ , and m is a probability measure on [0, 1].
When m(·) admits a density φ(·) on [0, 1], V (X) becomes the Yaari’s dual preference
measure (Yaari, 1987). In this case, problem (C.1) has been investigated by He and Zhou
(2011) when φ(·) satisfies a monotonicity condition. On the other hand, He et al. (2015)
consider a mean-risk portfolio choice problem which is similar to (C.1) but with an additional
constraint standing for the mean target of the agent.
Assumption 3 ρ is positive and has no atom, i.e., its CDF is continuous, and E[ρ] ≤ 1.
Denote ρ := essinf ρ ≥ 0, δ := E[ρ] ≤ 1, and F−1ρ as the quantile function of ρ. Because
ρ > 0 almost surely, we must have F−1ρ (z) > 0, z ∈ (0, 1). Following He and Zhou (2011),
we reformulate problem (C.1) as
Max
G(·)∈G
∫
[0,1]
G(z)m(dz)
Subject to
∫ 1
0
F−1ρ (1− z)G(z)dz ≤ x˜, G(0) ≥ 0,
(C.2)
where G is the set of quantile functions, i.e.,
G := {G(·) : [0, 1]→ R ∪ {±∞}|G(·) is finite-valued, right-continuous,
and increasing in (0, 1) and G(0) = lim
z↓0
G(z), G(1) = lim
z↑1
G(z)}.
According to the general theory in He and Zhou (2011), problems (C.1) and (C.2) share
the same optimal value and are equivalent in terms of the existence and uniqueness of the
optimal solution. Furthermore, if G∗(·) is optimal to (C.2), then G∗(1−Fρ(ρ)) is optimal to
(C.1). Therefore, we only need to solve problem (C.2).
Note that the objective function of (C.2) is linear in the decision variable G(·). Therefore,
we only need to optimize over the extremal points of the set of feasible quantiles to problem
(C.2). Jin and Zhou (2008, Proposition D.3) show that the extremal points are contained in
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the set of binary quantile functions
S :=
{
G(·)|G(z) = a+ k1z∈[c,1] for some c ∈ (0, 1) and a, k ≥ 0
such that
∫ 1
0
F−1ρ (1− z)G(z)dz ≤ x˜
}
.
Thus, we only need to consider
Max
G(·)∈S
∫
[0,1]
G(z)m(dz). (C.3)
Indeed, we can show that problems (C.2) and (C.3) have the same optimal value and,
consequently, if G∗(·) is optimal to problem (C.3), then it is also optimal to (C.2).
Denote f(a, k, c) as the objective function of problem (C.3) with G(z) = a + k1z∈[c,1].
Straightforward calculation shows that f(a, k, c) = a+km([c, 1]). As a result, problem (C.3)
can be written as
Max a+ km([c, 1])
Subject to aδ + k
∫ 1
c
F−1ρ (1− z)dz ≤ x˜, a, k ≥ 0, c ∈ (0, 1).
(C.4)
It is obvious that the optimal k must bind the first constraint in the above. Consequently,
we only need to maximize
f˜(a, c) := ζ(c)x˜+ [1− δζ(c)]a
over c ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ [0, x˜/δ], where
ζ(c) :=
m([c, 1])∫ 1
c
F−1ρ (1− z)dz
.
One can see that
max
a∈[0,x˜/δ]
f˜(a, c) = ζ(c)x˜+max(1− δζ(c), 0) x˜
δ
= max(1/δ, ζ(c))x˜.
Therefore, we only need to maximize max(1/δ, ζ(c)) over c ∈ (0, 1).
In the following, denote
γ∗ := sup
c∈(0,1)
ζ(c).
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Then, we have supc∈(0,1)max(1/δ, ζ(c)) = max(1/δ, γ
∗).
Theorem 3 The optimal value of problem (C.1) is max(1/δ, γ∗)x˜. Furthermore,
(i) If γ∗ = +∞, there exist βn → ρ such that X˜n := kn1ρ≤βn with kn := x˜/E[ρ1ρ≤βn ] is
feasible and approaches the infinite optimal value when n goes to infinity.
(ii) If γ∗ ≤ 1/δ, X˜∗ ≡ x˜/δ is optimal to problem (C.1).
(iii) If 1/δ < γ∗ = supc∈(0,1) ζ(c) < +∞ and the supremum is attained at c∗ ∈ (0, 1), then
X˜∗ := k∗1ρ≤β∗ with β∗ := F−1ρ (1− c∗) and k∗ := x˜E[ρ1ρ≤β∗ ] is optimal to problem (C.1).
(iv) If 1/δ < γ∗ = supc∈(0,1) ζ(c) < +∞ and the supremum is not attainable, then the
optimal solution to problem (C.1) does not exist. Furthermore, for any βn := F
−1
ρ (1−
cn) with ζ(cn)→ γ∗ as n→∞, X˜n := kn1ρ≤βn with kn := x˜/E[ρ1ρ≤βn ] is feasible and
approaches the optimal value when n goes to infinity.
Proof Problem (C.4) has optimal value max(1/δ, γ∗)x˜, so does problem (C.1). Consequently,
in case (i), the optimal value of problem (C.1) is infinite. Furthermore, there exist cn such
that ζ(cn) → γ∗ = +∞. Because m([c, 1]) ≤ 1 for any c ∈ [0, 1] and
∫ 1
c
F−1ρ (1 − z)dz is
continuous, positive, and strictly decreasing in c ∈ [0, 1), ζ(c) is bounded in [0, 1− δ] for any
δ > 0. Consequently, we must have cn → 1. Define βn := F−1ρ (1 − cn) and X˜n := kn1ρ≤βn.
It is straightforward to see that X˜n is feasible and approaches the infinite optimal value.
In case (ii), the optimal value of problem (C.1) is x˜/δ. It is obvious that X˜∗ = x˜/δ
achieves this optimal value.
In case (iii), the optimizer c∗ of ζ(·), a∗ := 0, and k∗ := x˜∫ 1
c∗
F−1ρ (1−z)dz
are optimal to
problem (C.4). As a result, G∗(z) = a∗ + k∗1z∈[c∗,1] is optimal to problem (C.2), so X˜∗ =
G∗(1− Fρ(ρ)) is optimal to problem (C.1).
In case (iv), the optimal value of problem (C.2) is x˜γ∗. We show that the optimal
solution to problem (C.2) does not exist. Suppose G(·) is optimal to problem (C.2). Then,
G(·) cannot be a constant on (0, 1). Otherwise, suppose G(z) = a, z ∈ (0, 1), which also
implies G(0) = G(0+) = a and G(1) = G(1−) = a. Then,
∫
[0,1]
G(z)m(dz) = a ≤ x˜/δ < x˜γ∗,
where the first inequality is the case because G(·) must satisfy the budget constraint. Thus,
we conclude that G(·) cannot be a constant on (0, 1).
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Denote ν(·) as the measure induced by G(·) on (0, 1], i.e., ν((0, z]) := G(z) − G(0) for
any z ∈ (0, 1]. Because G(·) is nonconstant on (0, 1), ν(·) has nonzero measure on (0, 1).
Then, we have
∫
[0,1]
G(z)m(dz) = G(0) +
∫
[0,1]
∫
(0,z]
ν(ds)m(dz) = G(0) +
∫
(0,1]
∫
[s,1]
m(dz)ν(ds)
= G(0) +
∫
(0,1]
m([s, 1])ν(ds) = G(0) +
∫
(0,1]
ζ(s)
∫ 1
s
F−1ρ (1− z)dzν(ds)
< G(0) + γ∗
∫
(0,1]
∫ 1
s
F−1ρ (1− z)dzν(ds)
= G(0) + γ∗
(∫ 1
0
F−1ρ (1− z)G(z)dz −G(0)
∫ 1
0
F−1ρ (1− z)dz
)
≤ γ∗x˜,
where the first inequality is the case because ζ(s) < γ∗, s ∈ (0, 1) and ν has nonzero measure
on (0, 1), and the second inequality is the case because
∫ 1
0
F−1ρ (1 − z)G(z)dz ≤ x˜ and
γ∗ > ζ(0) = 1∫ 1
0 F
−1
ρ (1−z)dz
= 1/δ. Therefore, G(·) cannot attain the optimal value, so the
optimal solution to problem (C.2) does not exist. Consequently, problem (C.1) does not
admit optimal solutions either.
Finally, it is straightforward to see that X˜n := kn1ρ≤βn is feasible and approaches the
optimal value as n→ +∞. 
We have completely solved problem (C.1) and the solution depends critically on the
quantity γ∗. When γ∗ = +∞, the optimal value is infinite, so problem (C.1) is ill-posed.
This result generalizes Theorem 3.4 in He and Zhou (2011). Furthermore, the asymptotically
optimal strategy taken by the agent in this case is Xn = kn1{ρ≤βn} with βn → ρ. In this
strategy, the probability of having nonzero payoffs is nearly zero, so the strategy is extremely
risky.
When γ∗ ≤ 1/δ, the optimal payoff is constant, indicating the strategy of investing all
money in the risk-free account, an extremely conservative strategy.
When γ∗ = supc∈(0,1) ζ(c) > 1/δ and the supremum is not attainable, problem (C.1) is also
ill-posed and the asymptotically optimal strategy is Xn = kn1{ρ≤βn} with βn := F
−1
ρ (1− cn)
and ζ(cn)→ γ∗. Ifm([c, 1]) is continuous in [0, 1], which is the case when m admits a density,
then ζ(c) is continuous in [0, 1). Consequently, we must have cn → 1 and thus βn → ρ. As
a result, the probability of Xn taking nonzero payoffs is nearly zero, showing that it is an
extremely risky strategy.
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Finally, when γ∗ = ζ(c∗) ∈ (1/δ,+∞) for some c∗ ∈ (0, 1), the optimal payoff is a digital
option: receiving k∗ in good market scenarios (ρ ≤ β∗) or receiving nothing in bad market
scenarios (ρ > β∗). This result generalizes Theorem 3.7 in He and Zhou (2011) where m is
assumed to admit a density and the density is assumed to satisfy a monotonicity condition.
Typically, γ∗ > 1/δ, so the optimal solution, if exists, must be a digital option. Indeed,
limc↓0 ζ(c) = m([0, 1])/
∫ 1
0
F−1ρ (1 − z)dz = 1/δ, showing that γ∗ ≥ 1/δ always holds. If
furthermore, m has zero measure in a neighbourhood of 0, e.g., in [0, ǫ] for some ǫ > 0, then
γ∗ ≥ ζ(ǫ) = m([ǫ, 1])/ ∫ 1
ǫ
F−1ρ (1 − z)dz > 1/δ. Therefore, γ∗ ≤ 1/δ only when the agent
imposes significant weight on the quantiles of the terminal payoff at levels near zero, i.e.,
only when the agent is so conservative that she wants to minimize the maximum potential
loss in the downside.
When 1/δ < γ∗ = ζ(c∗) < +∞ for some c∗ ∈ (0, 1), the optimal solution is a digital option
and is totally different from the optimal payoff of an expected utility maximizer which is
smooth in the pricing kernel ρ. Note that when the initial wealth x˜ increases, β∗ does not
change, so the probability of the digital option being “in the money” at the terminal time
does not change. On the other hand, the payoff k∗ of the digital option when it is in the
money increases. This feature is totally different from the optimal payoff of a goal-reaching
agent (Browne, 1999). Indeed, the optimal payoff of a goad-reaching agent is also digital.
However, the probability of this option being in the money increases with respect to the
initial wealth but the in-the-money payoff does not depend on the initial wealth. Similar
observations are also made in He and Zhou (2011).
Corollary 1 Suppose that m is the point mass at α ∈ (0, 1). Then, γ∗ = ζ(α) > 1/δ and
X˜∗ := k∗1ρ≤β∗ with β∗ := F−1ρ (1− α) and k∗ := x˜E[ρ1ρ≤β∗ ] is optimal to problem (C.1).
Proof of Corollary 1 Straightforward calculation shows that
ζ(c) =
1∫ 1
c
F−1ρ (1− z)dz
1{c≤α}, c ∈ (0, 1).
Clearly,
γ∗ = ζ(α) =
1∫ 1
α
F−1ρ (1− z)dz
>
1∫ 1
0
F−1ρ (1− z)dz
= 1/δ.
As a result, Theorem 3-(iii) applies and the proof completes. 
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